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Predicativism and the presuppositional view of proper names

In my contribution I would like to compare two metalinguistic accounts of names, predicativism and a presuppositional account I have been defending, on both of which the semantic contribution of N is (an elaboration of) being called N. Following early work by Burge, Delia Graf Fara and others have been advocating a predicativist account, on which names semantically behave like common nouns (Fara, *Philosophical Review* forthcoming).

The presuppositional view on names I defend shares important features with these views, but it also differs in important respects. The presuppositional account I advocate incorporates both elements of “metalinguistic” proposals and of Kripke’s own causal-historical communication chain. On this view, a token N of a proper name contributes x to the content of the main speech act made by the utterance including it given an associated ancillary presupposition, that x is whoever or whatever is saliently called N. There is a connection with predicativist views here; but in my view we do not need to go as far as denying a purely referential, central use for proper names.

Key words: names, naming practices, reference, presuppositions

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Reference and linguistic idealism

The linguistic idealist holds that everything is expressible in language. An implication of this position is that all objects are nameable or, equivalently, that every object can be referred to by some linguistic expression or other. The paper considers some apparent counterexamples to this thesis: in particular it looks at pairs of correlative objects that seem to be linguistically indistinguishable *inter se*, and at the question of the nameability of the uncomputable real numbers. It is argued that some of the suggested counterexamples fail, but others do succeed in forcing a concession from the doctrine of linguistic idealism, which must in consequence structure its central claim in a more nuanced way.

Key words: linguistic idealism, reference, nameability

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The grammar of essential indexicality: why it matters

Words have content properties, and grammar is irrelevant to these – it doesn't matter to the difference, say, between MAN and WOMAN. But words, based on their content properties, are also used for purposes of reference, and grammar is not irrelevant to that. Indeed, words (i) only *have* referential uses when occurring in particular grammatical configurations, (ii) which type of referential use is involved co-varies with the type of grammatical configuration (Hinzen & Sheehan 2013). This applies to such uses of MAN as in picking out a specific man, referring to a man who was mentioned before, or making a general statement about men. Grammar at a phrasal and sentential level co-varies with differences in these forms of reference. These forms range, more specifically, from generic to indefinite, definite, rigid, deictic, and personal ones. As we go from left to right of this hierarchically ordered list, lexical content properties are first *required*, then they become *optional* (at the deictic layer, where demonstratives such as 'this' can occur without an NP complement), and finally they become *illicit* (*I man). A way of putting this is that the forms of reference range from the most lexically based to the least lexically based ones. At the top of this hierarchy we find the referential use of personal pronouns such as 'I', which have no content properties whatsoever and cross-linguistically even lack Gender, and arguably Number, unlike third-Person pronouns.

The most grammatical and least lexical forms of reference are also the best candidates for essential indexicality, suggesting a correlation between grammar and a particular – and philosophically particularly intriguing – form of reference. I argue that the grammar of the essential indexical is not only essential to its nature, existence, and use, but explains the distinguishing features of indexicals in the relevant uses. In particular, it cast doubt on the view that indexicals refer just like proper names do, except in a context-sensitive manner. With the Kripkean revolution it became clear, as is now widely accepted, that proper names involve a different form of reference than definite descriptions. In the terms above, they are at a different layer of the referential hierarchy, in line with differences in their respective grammars. The essential point of this talk is that the same applies to indexicals: just as proper names differ from definite descriptions in how they refer, indexical pronouns differ from proper names in how they refer. Neither making a semantic theory designed for proper names contextual nor endowing indexicals with special semantic 'senses' is going to reveal

their intrinsic nature or rationalize their universal existence in human grammar. The long-standing insight that pronouns are a particular locus of vulnerability across cognitive disorders further reinforces their foundational significance in the study of both language and cognition, and the interconnections between these.

Key words: essential indexicality, indexicals, reference

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Context, vagueness and reference

In recent years contextual conceptions of personal taste predicates (PTP) and vague predicates have become quite popular. Quite a few of them share the assumption that in order to ascribe truth-values to the ascriptions of such predicates an additional element has to be added to the circumstances of evaluation. In the case of PTP ascriptions it might be the judge parameter (see Lasersohn 2005) while in the case of vague predicates it might be the count-as parameter (see MacFarlane 2007). The important difference between PTP theories and vague predicate theories is that only the latter assume the dynamic effect of utterances concerning borderline cases on the context of discourse. If one says of a borderline case *a* that it is tall and *b* is slightly taller than *a*, then one has to admit – when asked – that *b* is tall as well. PTP which are multidimensional and with which there is no associated scale (such as e.g. "tasty") do not have this effect. That is why sorites paradoxes are much harder to construct for them.

However, some PTP are vague and unidimensional and are as sorites-prone as "regular" vague predicates. In my talk I'm going to present a contextual conception of vagueness which exploits the similarities between PTP and "regular" vague predicates. First, I'll try to argue that in the case of unidimensional PTP such as "salty", when we predicate saltiness of a clear case of e.g. salty water our ascription "The water is salty" might mean roughly that the water is salty simpliciter (absolutely, whatever the context), not just salty for us. On the other hand, if the water is merely salty-ish, but we are asked to decide whether to call it "salty" or not, and we say that it is salty, the content of such a speech act is just that *that the water is salty* is true relative to the given context. We've decided to treat this assertion as true for the purpose of the conversation at hand, but we do not mean by this that it should be regarded as salty in all contexts. We say "The water is salty" but what we really mean is that the water is salty-according-to-us (in the given context).

I suggest further that we interpret normal everyday usage of all vague predicates (such as "tall", "rich" etc.) in the same manner. That is for every vague predicate *F*, when someone takes *a* to be a clear case of *F*-ness and says "*a* is *F*", his utterance says that *a* is *F* simpliciter (whatever the context), whereas when someone takes *a* to be a

borderline case, his assertion says merely that *a* is *F*-according-to him (in the given context).

My view wedges two main types of contextualism: content-contextualism and truth-contextualism. One of the most powerful objections against contextualist theories of vagueness is that they are not able to account for disagreement. So, it is a clear advantage of my conception that it allows both genuine disagreement concerning clear cases and faultless disagreement concerning borderline cases.

Key words: contextualism, disagreement, personal taste predicates, vague predicates

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**Against descriptivism: on an essential difference
between proper names and definite descriptions**

According to descriptivism, proper names are synonymous with (rigidly designating) definite descriptions. Thus, the two kinds of expression are supposed to be semantically indistinguishable. I am going to argue, contrary to descriptivism, that there is an essential and irreducible semantic difference between them.

The difference in question is connected with various ways in which these kinds of expression are related to extra-linguistic entities. Definite descriptions designate extra-linguistic entities *satisfactionally* while proper names designate them *conventionally*. More precisely, a definite description 'the *F*' designates an object *o* with respect to a possible world *w* provided *o* satisfies, relative to *w*, the descriptive condition expressed by 'the *F*' (i.e. provided *o* exemplifies, in *w*, the property of *being a unique F*, where *being an F* is a property expressed by the predicate part of 'the *F*'). On the other hand, a proper name *n* designates an object *o* provided it was *decided* that *n* is a name of *o*. Assuming that such decisions give rise to semantic (linguistic) conventions of a sort, *n* designates *o* provided there is a semantic convention associating *n* with *o*. Since linguistic conventions are independent of possible worlds (in that they are in force irrespective of any possible world), the relation of conventional designation is independent of them as well.

Now it will be argued that the difference between satisfactional designation and conventional designation can be used to justify certain well-known classifications of rigid designators. According to S. Kripke, *rigidity de facto* should be distinguished from *rigidity de jure*; according to N. Salmon, *persistent rigidity* should be distinguished from *obstinate rigidity*. It will be shown that definite descriptions are both *de facto* rigid and persistently rigid *because* they designate satisfactionally. Analogously, proper names will be shown to be both *de jure* rigid and obstinately rigid *because* their designation relation is conventional. What is important is that one may derive semantically relevant conclusions from these distinctions; in particular, it can be derived that proper names and rigidly designating definite descriptions behave differently across possible worlds.

The underlying link between the two kinds of designation and the respective notions of rigidity is provided by the following pair of claims:

If a satisfactional rigid designator d_1 designates the same object o with respect to all possible worlds w (relative to which d_1 designates anything) there is some property P such that o has to exemplify P in w in order to be designated by d_1 relative to w .

If a conventional rigid designator d_2 designates the same object o with respect to all possible worlds w (relative to which d_2 designates anything) there is no property P such that o has to exemplify P in w in order to be designated by d_2 relative to w .

Obviously, the two claims are incompatible: if an expression is satisfactionally rigid it cannot be conventionally rigid and *vice versa*. This is the very source of the essential difference between names and descriptions; it is also the (or a) reason why descriptivism is wrong.

Key words: conventional designation vs. satisfactional designation, descriptivism, obstinate rigidity, proper name, rigidity de jure

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Modality as a window into cognition

My talk will focus on a cluster of natural language expressions that provide us with a window into cognition, including, for example, progressives like 'Mary is crossing the Atlantic' and statives like 'Mary is in Paris for a week.' These otherwise-eclectic expressions all give rise to modal interpretations though, as I argue, they give rise to these modal interpretations despite the fact that they do not have linguistically-encoded modal meanings (unlike explicitly modal expressions such as 'must' and 'might'). An explanation of these interpretations, then, tells us about more than the meanings of these expressions: it tells us something about modal cognition, namely, how it comes to be engaged by these expressions and about what its interpretive output is once it is so engaged. We can say, in short, that these expressions reveal not the modal structure of *language*, but the modal structure of *cognition*.

Expressions with these characteristics are unfamiliar and the sort of explanation that they call for departs from standard models of explanation in both linguistics and the philosophy of language. After all, it is standardly assumed that the task of providing an analysis of the meaning of an expression and the task of providing an analysis of systematic aspects of its interpretation (particularly those that are context-independent) are one and the same. This raises some issues concerning the intelligibility of such explanations. I want to focus on these issues. In the course of my talk I'll be addressing questions like "Why has it taken so long to recognize the character of these expressions?", "Why should the interpretations to which they give rise be expected?" and "Where else might we find interpretations like these?" The answers to these questions reveal a great deal about the limitations of dominant frameworks for thinking about meaning and interpretation in both linguistics and philosophy as well as something about how they need to be revised.

Key words: semantic explanation, language-cognition interface, philosophy of language, modality, progressives, futurates, statives

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Horizontal and vertical aspects of construal and linguistic coding of narrative

Construal, one of the central terms in cognitive linguistics, has been defined as a relation between the conceptualizer and the object of conceptualization (c.f. Langacker 1991). This author maintains a distinction between construal and coding. The former is associated with mental activity during meaning creation (i.e. non-linguistic), whereas the latter with any, also linguistic, attempt to communicate the details of a particular construal of reality as it is perceived or remembered. Narratives are discourse coherences (cf. Labov and Waletzky 1967, Labov 1997, 2001, 2004, 2006, 20011) with a well-defined sequence of constitutive parts, whose basic units are events, "segments[s] of time at a given location perceived by an observer to have a beginning and end" (Zacks and Tversky 2001: 7).

The goal of the presentation is to survey two aspects of construal and coding of narratives. The so-called horizontal dimension refers to the configurations at the level of a single event or a scene, whereas the vertical dimension describes how sequences of events form the coherence of the whole story. The author of the presentation will provide examples of experimental research (e.g. Badio 2014; Zwaan, Graesser and Magliano 1995; Madden and Zwaan 2003; Ibbotson, Lieven and Tomassello 2013) used to answer questions regarding both of the above-mentioned levels of analysis and description. Moreover, it will be argued that achieving the desired levels of cognitive prominence (salience) is the ultimate goal of construal-coding processes operating both horizontally as well as vertically within a given narrative.

Key words: construal, coding, narrative, event, discourse, scene

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Expressibility, effability, and background-dependence

There is considerable tension in John R. Searle's philosophy of language between the so-called Principle of Expressibility (which can be formulated by the famous slogan "whatever can be meant can be said" [Searle 1978/1979: 134]) and his views on the role of the so-called Background in the determination of meaning ("The literal meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth conditions given a set of background practices and assumptions" [Searle 1980: 227]). According to the prominent view in the philosophical literature, this tension cannot be dissolved: while Searle's claims on the Background seem to imply that linguistic meaning radically underdetermines the truth-conditions of an utterance (or communicated content), the Principle of Expressibility, by contrast, is a characteristically literalist principle (Carston 2002: 64–70; Recanati 2003; Kissine 2011). However, everything hinges on the formulation of the Principle of Expressibility—whether 'said' means simply "expressed by some utterance" or, more substantively, "encoded by some sentence in the language" (like Katz's [1972] Principle of Effability) or something in-between—and on the very conception of background practices and assumptions underlying our everyday speech acts.

In my presentation I will argue that (1) Searle's (1969) original version of the Principle of Expressibility is only a *methodological* principle (as opposed to a genuine metaphysical principle about the nature of the connection between thoughts and utterances); (2) the principle, appropriately conceived, does not commit us to the view that every literally used sentence determines the illocutionary force of the utterance by its linguistic (conventionally encoded) meaning, nor to the view—*contra* what Kissine (2012) explicitly asserts—that the illocutionary force in every case is directly derivable from the sentence's linguistic meaning. Finally, I will expose problems with (3) Recanati's (2003) claim that the analogy drawn by Searle between the background-dependence of intentional content and of semantic content breaks down. Therefore Searle's generalization of background-dependence to all intentional states *does* enable him to save the Principle of Expressibility.

Key words: pragmatics, semantics, speech act theory, principle of expressibility, meaning

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The cluster-occurrence theory of proper names

Individuals are typically construed semantically as primitive elements (of the universe of the underlying model). However, as observed by Searle (1983), the cognitive operation of *individualization* that gives rise to the conception of an individual is a twofold process, consisting in a former instantaneous *individuation* (“this is to stand for an isolated object”), and a subsequent temporal *identification*, or recognition (“this is the same object as the one we previously isolated”). The standard model ignores the latter stage.

In the present framework, individual *occurrences* (to be distinguished from the metaphysical notion of “temporal stages”) are the objects that now populate the universe. The notion of an individual is then obtained through a non-logical *individuality* (equivalence) *relation* over individual occurrences, whose extension consists of pairs of (different or not) occurrences of the same individual.

This gives us a hint of how the semantics of proper names could be conceived in the new setting: the meaning of a name is an individual, whereas its reference is an individual occurrence.

The meaning of “Barack Obama” is the individual Barack Obama, the ‘summation’ of all individual occurrences of that individual. For example in the sentence: “In 1963, Barack Obama pronounced his first words,” the meaning of “Barack Obama” is the individual Barack Obama, and its reference is baby Barack. This contrasts with the sentence: “In 2009, Barack Obama pronounced his first words as president of the United States,” in which the meaning is still the individual Barack Obama (including among others the occurrences of baby Barack and president Obama), but the reference is president Obama.

I shall discuss the present proposal in connection with the cluster-description and the causal theories of proper names, showing how it preserves their intuitions while overcoming their weaknesses.

Key words: philosophy of language, meaning and reference, proper names, individuals, descriptions, referential rigidity

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Externalistic derogation

This paper argues that there cannot be non-derogatory, non-appropriated uses of racial, homophobic or sexist slurs, contrary to what some authors have contended. I focus on two groups presented in the literature of alleged examples of such uses. The first example is provided by so-called pedagogical uses, that is, uses in which a competent speaker (e.g. a teacher) uses a term to illustrate its meaning, or to impart some values to non-competent speakers (e.g. children). The second group consists of so-called "affection" uses, in which a competent speaker uses the slur as an either neutral or positive term, while explicitly manifesting her respect to the targeted group. I argue that it is a mistake to think that both uses could be non-derogatory. In the first "pedagogical" case, there is reason to think that the speaker is engaging in "mimicked use" – a mere pretence of use that is unaccompanied by the usual commitments that pertain to a genuine use. In the second "affection" case, the term retains its derogating potential, given that any hearer could question or criticize the speaker's use; and even supposing the use doesn't offend any member of the targeted group, it is likely that its derogatory potential is detected and cancelled by the charitable interpreter; yet the use comes with a derogatory force from the start. Lastly, I concentrate on purported affectionate uses, arguing that they presuppose what may be called Internalism about derogation, whereby whether the use of a term is derogatory is a matter that can be determined by the intentions of the speaker. I then set forth what I call Externalism about derogation, according to which whether a term is derogatory depends on the way and degree to which it expresses derogation at the level of its socially and culturally shaped communicative import.

Key words: slurs, derogatory terms, racist and sexist language, semantic internalism, semantic externalism, use, mention, quotation

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Thought experiments in semantics: an (apparent) puzzle

It is a platitude that thought experiments are used in various areas of philosophy, including semantics and philosophy of language (cf., e.g., H. Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, *Mind, Language, and Reality*, *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, pp. 215-271). However, thought experiments are primarily concerned with counterfactual possibilities, either logical or nomological, putting actuality considerations aside. On the other hand, semantic conceptions theorize about what the actual meaning of expressions is like, or what the actual relation between natural language expressions and certain (non-linguistic) entities is. Then an apparent puzzle arises: how could any considerations of counterfactual possibilities tell anything relevant about the actual properties of semantic entities – such as expressions, meanings, referents and their relations? In other words, how could conclusions of thought experiments, which come with information of what is (not) possible, bear any relevance to theoretical judgments of what is actually the case in the area of semantics?

I try to explain away the puzzle by taking an assumption of conceptual normativity of language into account. Simply put, it assumes that using language amounts to using (beside other things) a conceptual system which is determined by various relations between its components (meanings, or concepts). Although it is a contingent fact which language we use, the underlying structure of concepts is not. For using certain concepts of given language includes knowledge of such relations between (sets of) concepts as being a constituent of, being a proper subset of, be entailed by, or be inconsistent with, etc. Thus conceptual relations are, irreducibly, modal. Actually correct use of concepts requires knowledge of possible (permitted) and impossible (forbidden) applications. Hence, in principle, there is room for using thought experiments in semantics.

Key words: assumption of conceptual normativity, concepts, conceptual systems, puzzle, semantics, thought experiments

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On the so-called “cognitive” theory of metaphors

My aim is to connect Lakoff & Johnson’s “cognitive” theory of metaphor with the language-thought debate. According to L&J, metaphor is a cognitive phenomenon. The focus is on metaphorical concepts, not on metaphorical expressions (of supposedly literal thoughts). This aspect of their model is traditional in defending the autonomy and priority of thought and the exclusive communicative function of language. On the other hand, in contemporary research on thought and metaphor, a common assumption is that metaphor depends in complex ways on the interaction of brains, bodies, languages and culture, a view that contradicts a purely mentalistic approach: more factors (apart from language and thought) are considered, and the emphasis is on the *interaction* of factors, not on unilateral dependencies. I’ll argue that in fact L&J fit this more complex picture.

First, I define *neo-Whorfism* as a family of contemporary approaches that argue for the influence of language(s) on thought. Second, I critically examine L&J’s arguments for the cognitive character of metaphor: metaphorical systematicity, metaphorical inference, and the cognitive use of metaphors outside communicative contexts. Third, I argue that L&J also give arguments for interesting forms of priority of metaphorical language over metaphorical thought (and for the influence of further factors, like culture and bodily experience):

- a. Argument based on ontogeny.
- b. Argument based on the conventionality of most metaphors.
- c. Argument based on habit.
- d. Argument based on “Orwellian” uses of metaphors.

Finally, some features of L&J’s view can be used to avoid controversial aspects of classical Whorfism. Languages incorporate different metaphors for speaking of a single phenomenon. This metaphorical pluralism implies that although thought is influenced by linguistic metaphors it can still choose among them, and so it is not determined by them.

Key words: metaphor, language, thought, Lakoff & Johnson, linguistic determinism

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Because it shows. Using corpora for studying causal reasoning

Empirical studies of causal argumentation face a number of challenges. As Kuhn observes, “researchers studying causal reasoning skills in adults have typically based their conclusions on studies of a narrow segment of the adult population in a specific context” (Kuhn 2007, 44, 47). The preference for lab experiments cannot surprise, given that these allow a maximum of control and can be efficiently used to assess behaviour in response to minimally varied conditions. But lab experiments have certain limitations as well, even when Kuhn’s critique is heeded and a more diverse choice of subjects made. Most importantly, being in the lab creates a situation whose artificiality can influence the subjects’ responses by priming their attention to aspects of the situation that are relevant to the issue under inquiry. As I would like to show, corpus linguistics—a methodology relatively unknown in Argumentation Theory—may therefore prove to be a valuable addition to the more common experimental paradigms. Since argumentation is a pervasive linguistic activity and causal reasoning is frequent in arguing, linguistic data for the study of causal reasoning is comparatively easy to come by in linguistic text-corpora. Oestermeier and Hesse (2000) have provided a corpus-based typology for causal argument that might well be exhaustive. This typology features twenty-seven types of causal arguments. However, one of these accounts for 80 % of the total number of causal arguments in their corpus. This raises not only immediate worries about the suitability of their analytical grid but also more generally about the availability of data on the less frequent argument types. One might also wonder how to study the persuasiveness of different argument types with the help of corpora. I will demonstrate that these worries pose no serious objection against a more prominent role for corpus linguistics in the study of causal reasoning.

Key words: causal reasoning, causal arguments, experimental philosophy, corpus linguistics

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The problem of the essential *de re*

Both Perry and Lewis introduced the problem of the essential indexical as if this arose specifically for *de se* attitudes, as opposed to *de dicto* and *de re* attitudes. In the first part of this paper I argue that this original demarcation mislocated the real problem: this arises for all *de re* attitudes, including the *de se* ones, as opposed to *de dicto* attitudes. Thus, a subject may be propositionally omniscient about an individual and nonetheless fail to know, of some particular object of acquaintance, that *it* is the individual in question. I argue that the reason for this is Fregean: reference is never part of content, so that singular propositions are not suitable objects of thought. But *pace* Frege, and in a Lewisian spirit, thought contents need not be absolute propositions: some contents are properties, true or false only relative to a world centred on an individual and a time. What Lewis failed to see was that the individual at the centre need not be the subject: it can be any object of perception. Acquaintance, by offering us new circumstances of evaluation, affords singular truth-conditions without singular propositions. In the second part of the paper I deal with Perry's objection to relativised contents. This aimed to show that these do not explain the cognitive contrast between *de se* and *de re* attitudes targeting the same referent. I argue that this verdict, although correct, does not undermine relativised contents: it only discredits the idea, resulting from the initial mislocation of the problem, that whatever solves the problem of the essential indexical should also explain the contrast between *de se* and the other attitudes. Whereas the semantic contrast between *de dicto* and *de re* threatened propositionalism, the cognitive contrast between *de re* and *de se* called for modes of presentation.

Key words: singular reference, essential indexicals, *de se* attitudes, centred worlds, relativised contents, modes of presentation

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Semantic contextualism and scientific pluralism

This paper explores the relationship between semantic contextualism and philosophical pluralism. Semantic contextualism is understood here as a philosophical approach to linguistic meaning and interpretation and an intuitively plausible ground or rationale of a moderate anti-formalism – one which attempts to make good use of formal methods where they are applicable but which is otherwise content to proceed in terms of content as contrasted with over-emphasis on formal methods. Semantic contextualism involves a moderate semantic holism as contrasted with unrestricted or monistic holism, and it also avoids the opposite extreme of semantic atomism. In opposition to unrestricted semantic holism, we do not need to understand everything in order to understand particular matters of interest; and this point helps us focus on the corresponding epistemic question: how much do we need to know or understand, in order to justify particular claims of interest?

A scientific pluralism will be shown to arise more or less directly from contextual constraint on interpretation, and this pluralism is plausibly inherited by the scholarly disciplines generally. This includes a brief consideration of the ways in which the virtues of hypotheses enter into the pluralism of responses to particular, outstanding problems.

Key words: semantics, contextualism, pluralism, sciences, scholarly disciplines, virtues of hypotheses

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Speakers' intentions and the formal representation of context

The apparent referential dependence of certain indexicals on speakers' intentions (e.g., 'he', 'she', 'this', 'that') is problematic for a formal semantic theory, e.g., à la Kaplan (1989). In that framework an indexical is associated with a character, understood as a function taking features of context as input, and yielding the propositional content of the expression relative to that context. However, context, as represented formally, is restricted to a quadruple of parameters (time, location, agent and world) corresponding to "brute facts" of a context of utterance. Thus, insofar as certain indexicals depend on features beyond those represented in the formal context to fix their referent, namely speakers' intentions, the framework cannot directly accommodate them.

Expanding the context to include speakers' intentions appears to solve the problem. Thus, King (2014) maintains, "speaker intentions *can* be part of the context that determines semantic values and what is said" (p. 231). Similarly, Stokke (2010) defends "the natural suggestion that intentions are part of narrow context" (p. 393). But this modification also raises important questions about the role of context in a formal semantic theory and the status of the features it represents (as distinct from a pragmatic notion of context (cf. Stalnaker 1978; 2014)).

I argue against incorporating a speaker intention parameter into context given its explanatory role in a formal theory that aims to explicitly characterize *semantic* competence, which does not plausibly include an appeal to speakers' intentions. I also raise and defend a circularity problem for the proposal. Given a plausible account of linguistic communication, a speaker's intention in uttering a sentence is inferred by a hearer (partly) based on the semantic value of the sentence uttered. But, if one needs to identify the intention before the semantic value of the sentence uttered can be fixed, and the semantic value is needed in order to access the intention, then the intention is required to fix the semantic value, which is itself needed to access the intention.

Key words: semantics, speaker intentions, context, character, content, reference determination, Kaplan

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Time-reference and pragmatism in logical analysis: the dialogical case

Game semantics (Lorentz, Lorenzen, Hintikka) and more specially dialogical logic (Rahman) are logical frameworks designed to follow the dynamics of information into interactive structure such as dialogues or programs. The natural interpretations of their semantics are pragmatic ones and develop the idea that it is the use which makes the sense of analysed sentences rather than a calculus on pre-given truth-values or external denotations.

But, philosophically, this internalism suffers from its own success: in everyday life, we don't work on "time-closed" interactions, the "whole history of the uses of a word" is never available, and never required: *"We understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp the meaning at a stroke, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"* (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §138).

To overcome this problem and some subsequent issues (such as composition of dialogues or some points linked with the sceptical paradox) we propose a brand new analysis, which changes the "localisation" of interactions. Instead of focusing on the history of the dialogue (and so the history of the uses), the justification of each move or action has to be found in the actual trace of past events into the "present state of the dialogue": the position.

This solution leads us to develop a new promising (and promise-keeping) formalism based on dialogues of matrices, matrices which can be thought of as interactive Leibnizian monads or all-actual logical cells.

We will expose the main concepts and what light they shed on the aforementioned debate.

Key words: dialogical logic, pragmatism, semantical strategies, time, history & memory, Wittgenstein, justification, matrices

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Belief reports and context dependence (again)

Are belief reports context dependent? Many philosophers answer affirmatively. What is interesting, different proponents of the positive answer vary with respect to philosophical motivations for positing the context dependence of belief reports, they also describe the “mechanics” of the postulated context-dependence in different (possibly incomparable) manners. For example, *hidden-indexical theories* (e.g. Schiffer (1992), Jacob (1997), Zalta (2001)) are motivated mainly by variants of Frege’s puzzle while *comparison theories* (like the one of Stich (1983)) by the analysis of folk psychological talk. Moreover, it is quite easy to construct scenarios similar to the ones given by radical contextualists in order to justify the context dependence claim. However, scenarios of this sort (and their interpretations) fit well with comparison theories, while being rather distantly related to hidden-indexical theories (especially the ones that posit context dependent mode of presentation arguments within the logical form of belief sentences). The aim of our paper is mostly meta-theoretical: first of all, we would like to raise several issues regarding the general notion of *context dependence* and its applicability to belief reports, secondly, we would like to analyze the methodology of arguments that may be given in favour of the context-dependence theses (since, in fact, there are many distinct sorts of context-dependence, the claim that belief reports are context-dependent may be construed in many ways). Third, we would like to inquire into the relation of comparison theories and hidden-indexical theories to various sorts of context-sensitivity and to argumentation strategies used to support the claim that belief reports are context-sensitive.

Key words: belief reports, context, folk psychology, hidden-indexical theories of belief reports, comparison theories of belief reports

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Commitment in illocutionary acts

The aim of this paper is to explore a foundational issue in the theory of speech acts, namely, the notion of commitment as it is invoked to fulfil a constitutive role in the performance of certain illocutions. Austin (1962) declared that the whole point of commissive speech acts was to commit the speaker to a certain course of action. Moreover, he considered at least three conditions as necessary for the speech act to be felicitously performed: securing the hearer's uptake, bringing about a conventional effect, and (typically) inviting a response. It seems that there must be some conceptual connection between the commitment undertaken by the speaker and these three conditions being fulfilled, although this issue was not directly addressed by Austin.

Some recent proposals in interactional pragmatics can be seen as pointing to an answer. A common tenet of these accounts takes it that speech acts are context-changing social actions. Furthermore, these changes are produced by bringing about certain normative facts, namely facts that affect the commitments (and entitlements) of the interactants in that context (Sbisa 2002, 2006; Witek 2013, 2015; Budzynska and Witek 2014). Although I think this approach is essentially correct, it has to confront the challenge of accounting for hostile speech acts (e.g. threats and derogatory speech). Here, assigning a commitment to the speaker (to perform a certain action, or to a particular proposition and an attitude towards it, respectively) has the odd effect of blurring the perspective from which one could declare these speech acts to be incorrect, given the change they induce in the social context of the interactants. My aim is to further explore this issue, analyzing the notion of commitment at stake and suggesting some adjustments to the interactional account of speech acts.

Key words: speech acts, commitment, illocution, interactional pragmatics, threats, derogatory speech

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**The nature and content of propositional attitudes:
lessons of the explication problem**

It is still the prevailing view in philosophy that many mental states are propositional attitudes, an agent's distinct relational states having propositions for their content, and that reports of the form "S believes/fears/hopes/etc. that *p*" say something true iff referents of the name "S" and the clause "that *p*" stand in the relation that the particular attitude verb picks out. A number of philosophers appealed to the explication problem in order to undermine this view. The problem is this: when one reports S's particular attitude explicitly stating the kind or the nature of its content in accordance with the prevailing view, one often ends up with implausible reports, such as "S fears the proposition that *p*" or "S hopes an abstract entity". Philosophers that acknowledged and promoted this as a problem for the prevailing view interpreted it differently. Some took it as evidence that the prevailing view is altogether wrong and that we are in need of a radically different metaphysical conception of attitudes and semantic analysis of attitude reports. Others took the problem as showing that the prevailing view requires less radical refinements. In my paper, I will discuss the explication problem and its implications for metaphysics of attitudes and semantics of attitude reports. Firstly, I will argue that the problem does not support the conclusion that the prevailing view is in need of moderate refinements. If the explication problem is a problem for the prevailing view, it shows either that propositional attitudes are not relational or that they are relational but objectual (hence not propositional), and that one needs to adjust the semantic analysis accordingly. Then I will consider several strategies of showing that the explication problem is not a genuine problem for the prevailing view and that it does not support radical departures from this view.

Key words: propositional attitude reports, propositions, *that*-clauses, the explication problem, the relational analysis

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Interpretation of fallacies through abduction

This paper approaches fallacies from a contextual and dialectical framework, heeding intentionality as an aspect where abductive reasoning plays a necessary role. I will follow Davidson's work regarding intentional deviations from ordinary language usage, such as jokes, puns and metaphors, where there is a secret message that has to be discovered. To do this, I consider abductive reasoning as a process of dialogue that moves forward as we are asking/ answering certain questions. Therefore, abductive reasoning develops in a dialogue, which can be explicit or implicit (elliptical), and it is within this framework that each new hypothesis reached through an abduction should be analyzed and criticized.

This dialectical model for abduction is suitable for analyzing informal fallacies, where there are two parties that must work together fulfilling a series of requirements. Therefore, it is from this perspective that we can interpret fallacies, not only as errors of reasoning but as "malicious" tactics to shift the burden of proof.

For explanation purposes, I show a curious kind of fallacy, which I have called the ironic fallacy and is based on what Grice called conversational implicature.

Key words: abduction, abductive reasoning, conversational implicature, Davidson, dialogue, fallacies, Grice

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Allegedly isn't an epistemic modal

I reject theories which claim that locutions such as 'Allegedly' are types of epistemic modals, as explicitly suggested by Lyons (1977), and more recently by Von Fintel and Gillies (2007).

This question is interesting in part because, if it turns out that 'Allegedly' is an epistemic modal, it should be indexical to the speaker's beliefs about the world. Compare with locutions such as 'May', as in the proposition 'There may be a philosopher in the bar'. On the classic theory by Kratzer (1977. 1981), such propositions are true iff the presence of philosophers in bars is consistent with the speaker's other beliefs about the world.

'Allegedly' interests me because: (1) it seems intensional, e.g., the sentence 'Allegedly Scott is a Scot' may be true, yet 'Allegedly the author of *Waverley* is a Scot' may be false (cf. Davidson 1985); while (2) it doesn't share grammatical properties with other intensional locutions: 'Allegedly' lacks the overt subject of 'x believes that...', nor (so I argue) does it appear to be indexed to speakers as with epistemic modals.

Suppose, for *reductio*, that 'Allegedly' is an epistemic modal. Then it should be impossible for one to use 'Allegedly' to report a proposition one knows to be false. Let p abbreviate the proposition 'there is a set of all sets which isn't a member of itself'. Now suppose I know, and believe, Russell's Paradox. Then 'There may be a set of all sets which isn't a member of itself', if spoken by me, is false. However, it still seems I can say 'Allegedly p ', and this would be true, so long as *someone* has said it. Since this contradicts the understanding of 'Allegedly' as an epistemic modal, I conclude the proposals of Lyons and Von Fintel and Gillies are false.

Key words: natural language semantics, epistemic modality, reportatives, intensionality, indexicality and context-sensitivity

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***That*-clauses and singular terms**

Complement clauses introduced by *that*, which typically occur in sentences like:

Olga believes that Cicero is smart

It is true that Cicero is smart,

are usually called *that*-clauses. It is no exaggeration to say that for the past two thousand years in philosophy we almost all took for granted that *that*-clauses are singular terms (Boh 1993). There is no uncontroversial definition of *singular term*, but for our purposes an intuitive grasp of the notion should suffice. However the difficult cases are to be accommodated, the difference between syntactic and non-syntactic units is the difference between names, descriptions, predicates on the one hand and things like 's reason is', 'me while' on the other. Singular terms are, roughly, those units that purport to denote one thing.

The traditional theory is also taken to be *the face-value theory* (Schiffer 2003: 12-14) and with the aim in view of showing this alleged special status, examples like the following are provided:

That Cicero is smart is certain,

here, the *that*-clause arguably seems to denote the object to which the predicate is applied.

In this paper, I will deal with what I take to be both the most neglected and the strongest reason to reject the theory, which is the datum that *that*-clauses do not behave like singular terms in identity statements. I will present an argument to the effect that *that*-clauses are not singular terms and I will show that none of the possible attempts at resisting it seems promising.

Key words: 'that'-clauses, singular terms, the face-value theory, identity statements, equative, predicative, specificational copulas

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**Is the semantics of natural kind terms extendable to artifactual terms?
An examination of Putnam's thesis**

The aim of this paper is to examine the extension of the semantics of natural kind terms to artifactual terms put forward by Putnam in his work “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. In this paper, I make some proposals to extend Putnam's reference theory on natural kind terms to artifactual terms. However, I advance a view of the meaning of artifactual terms which conflicts with Putnam's claims on the semantics of these terms that would follow from his proposed extension of the semantics for natural kind terms to artifactual terms.

Key words: reference, meaning, natural kinds, artifactual kinds, Putnam

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Direct reference for social kinds: pejorative terms as recognitional files?

This paper attempts to fit into the picture of a bigger project where I wish to examine the possibility of a direct reference for social kinds. The paper was originally motivated by Mišćević's (2014) paper in which he tries to explore the possibility of pejorative terms as negative hybrid social kind terms that can refer singularly. He himself offers an account of a "hybrid theory of reference" which he adopts from Devitt and Sterelny (1999), thus extending it to social kinds. Furthermore, he believes his account might be compatible with theories of direct reference, such as Recanati's (2012). Recanati goes so far as to say his framework of recognitional files might be compatible with an account for natural kinds, thus further work on extending it to social kinds would need to be done. For these purposes, I introduce a tentative argument I call the Bridging argument:

P1: Recognitional files refer singularly. (Recanati)

P2: Natural kind terms are recognitional files. (Recanati)

P3: Social kind pejorative terms are recognitional files as well as natural kind terms. (Sk_pT) (The bridging premise)

P4: Pejorative terms belong to a cluster of social kind terms in language.
(Mišćević)

C: Sk_pT refer singularly.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to evaluate Mišćević's account, and also to see if his theory fits better into Recanati's framework of direct reference. I will proceed as follows. First, I summarize and, then, question Mišćević's account of reference for pejorative terms as social kind terms that refer singularly. Second, I explain Recanati's idea of recognitional files and show how it could possibly be applied to Mišćević's theory of pejoratives. Finally, I wish to reconsider this proposal and offer a tentative solution of reference for social kinds combining the indexical model and two-dimensional semantics.

Key words: direct reference, recognitional files, natural kind (term), social kind (term), pejoratives

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A problem of definition and truth

It is a great debate, how to formulate a rule – more properly an axiom – of truth; yet the current philosophical debate can be summarised as the following premise. If s means p , then s is true if and only if it is the case that p . This is a reoccurring formulation from Frege to Davidson, from Wittgenstein to Tarski. The problem here is setting synonymy and definition in a weak sense (that they can be substitutes for each) equal to one another. This equalisation gives birth to interdependence and an inter-verification, or in other terms, more formally, it involves circularity. This problem leaves us, as philosophers of language, no way to rationally prove but admit the definitions. The socio-lingual theory, championed by Putnam, however, seems to give a way out but there are metaphysical constraints specific to that theory as a whole, i.e. the notion of an “average speaker”. The problem does not cease to exist even if we merely admit the definitions but gets even bigger. Only a theory that non-circularly sets forth a formulation of truth and simultaneously a formulation of meaning (and definition) may be successful. The search for such a theory is still ongoing, yet the properties that such a theory has to possess can be revealed. The aim is to reveal those properties, if they are possible at all: so to speak, a non-sceptic refutation for the *problem of definition and truth*.

Key words: meaning, definition, synonymy, truth, socio-linguistic hypothesis

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Empty names and error theory

One of the most prominent options that the naïve Russellian has when it comes to empty names is to suggest that simple sentences containing them express an incomplete proposition. Accordingly, what “Vulcan is a planet” expresses can be represented as follows:

< __ , being a planet >.

I will provide an error theoretic account of the truth values and information content of such propositions. The negative claim that the error theorist makes is ontological, namely, just as the ethical error theorist claims that there are no moral properties, the naïve Russellian error theorist claims that there are no fictional, mythical, or imaginary objects. Just as the ethical error theorist holds that ethical theories that claim that there are moral properties are systematically wrong, the naïve Russellian error theorist holds that accounts of reference that claim that there are fictional, mythical, or imaginary objects are systematically wrong. The “error” in error theory is that while people imply or presuppose that the relevant objects or properties exist, no such objects exist. Rather, we only talk *as if* they do exist.

The positive story that an error theorist needs to tell should explain why people talk the way they do, even when they know the ontological facts of the matter. That is, the error theorist needs to explain, for example, why it is that even when we believe that Santa Claus is not real we keep talking as if he is real. The positive story needs to provide a plausible account of what is going on in our thought and with our language.

Key words: naïve Russellian, Millian, error theory, reference, incomplete propositions

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**On being called something:
evidence for substitutional quantification for English**

Substitutional quantification often gets a bad rap. One of the reasons for this seems to be that substitutional quantification is thought of as something dreamt up by philosophical logicians in order to avoid certain kinds of ontological commitments or to state theories of truth, but which has no intuitive basis in natural language.

Building on recent work by Delia Graff Fara and Ora Matushansky on appellative constructions like (1), I argue in this paper that the quantifier ‘something’ in (2) is a substitutional quantifier:

- (1) Sara called Geoff handsome.
- (2) Sara called Geoff something.

I call such quantifiers *appellation quantifiers*. Two features of appellation quantifiers are crucial to the argument. The first is obvious: (2) is a consequence of (1). Though this is obvious, some semantic treatments of the appellation quantifier ‘something’ in (2) fail to account for it. The second feature of appellation quantifiers is that they can serve as antecedents for ‘so-called’:

- (3) Sara called Geoff something, and everyone so-called is handsome.

There are two stages to the argument: (i) rejecting alternative analyses of ‘something’ in (2) and (3) as either a metalinguistic objectual quantifier or a second order quantifier, and (ii) providing a propositional semantics for substitutional quantification that explains both of the features identified above. The result is a new argument for the existence of substitutional quantification in English, one that does not turn on any ontological scruples over intensional objects, or dubious claims about schemata.

Key words: substitutional quantification, appellative-‘called’ constructions, so-anaphora

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Goodman and Calvino: a productive exchange of views

In September 1978, Massimo Piatteli Palmarini organized the Conference: *Livelli di realtà* (Grades of Reality). Various scholars from different fields took part in the Conference; among them were Goodman and Calvino.

Goodman, in his speech tried to analyse the thin line between the real and the unreal world. His goal was not to establish rules for distinguishing between real and unreal things. Instead, he wanted to understand what is a correct or a true version of the world. After that point, he goes on by asking why there are several versions of a world, and whether these versions are compatible. Goodman plays with the word “stories” and gives it two different meanings: tales and floors. According to Goodman, reality is similar to floors, and every floor is similar to a tale, due to the fact that stories (or descriptions) have a hand in objects, and we cannot separate an object from its description. In a nutshell: language and reality are linked together. There are as many worlds as there are languages. Consequently, an empirical observation of the world cannot show us what is a correct description of it, because the world pure and simple, does not exist. At the end of his paper, Goodman explicitly refers to Calvino's poetry. The American philosopher says that *Il cavaliere inesistente* is a metaphor and an image of his conception of reality. As Ser Agilulfo cannot be divided from its armour, concepts cannot be divided from reality. To conclude, the dialogue between Calvino and Goodman was deep and significant, especially because they share the idea that science and literature follow the same process in their development. In their opinion, a narrative leads our understanding of reality.

Key words: Goodman, Calvino, reality, language, literature

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Semantics of epistemic modal *must* (necessity)

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the semantics of epistemic modal of necessity *must*. I argue against von Fintel & Iatridou (2009) that although modals are not context-dependent (as, e.g., in Kratzer 1991), we cannot claim that by saying *must p* we assert the same strong quantificational meaning as by saying *p*. I show that epistemic modal *must* fulfils a particular role indicating that the denotation *p* needs to be verified in order to represent a truth value.

Von Fintel & Iatridou (2009) argue against the common claim (cf. Karttunen (1972), Groenendijk & Stokof (1975), Kratzer (1991), and many others) that sentences with epistemic *must* are as strong as assertion without the modal. In their analysis, the authors claim that *must p* conveys “indirectness without weakness” (von Fintel & Iatridou, *ibid.*). Therefore, an utterance with *must p* cannot be weakened:

(1) *Perhaps it isn't raining, but it must be.

This, according to von Fintel & Iatridou, proves that *must p* entails *p* ($must\ p \Rightarrow p$), and, therefore, that *must p* asserts strong quantificational meaning.

Even assuming that there are many situations where the reasoning is based on clear premises, and entailment $must\ p \Rightarrow p$ seems to be obvious, there are still many cases when reasoning may be obscure. If we consider the following sentence:

(2) Mary called that boy 'my son', so he must be her only son Andrew.

we can see, that using modal *must*, does not imply that the speaker utters a sentence to which truth value could not be automatically assigned. It is obvious that although by saying *must p* the speaker states that she believes that her reasoning is flawless, she does not state that she knows that *p* is true. The statement needs to be verified directly, and then accepted or rejected. It seems that *must p* is reserved for situations of reasoning that awaits updating. The mechanism of this operation, based on update semantics, will be presented in this paper.

Key words: modals, *must*, epistemic modals, update semantics, epistemic logic

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Indicative conditionals, probabilistic relevance and discourse structure

On the basis of notorious triviality results, suppositionalists about indicative conditionals (IC) argue that the meaning of those conditionals is not propositional. Explicating their theory in a probabilistic framework, the probability of an IC goes by the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. According to the suppositionalists, utterances of ICs do not have propositions as their conventional meanings but express high conditional probability and constitute conditional speech acts.

However, the suppositionalists' account of the meaning of ICs is more than vague. Moreover, it is unclear how such an account could fit into general frameworks of meaning and communication. Another problematic aspect is the reiteration of the second paradox of material implication in the suppositionalist framework: certainty of the consequent C validates all conditionals $A \supset C$ with arbitrary antecedent A with $P(A)$ exceeding 0. The intuition of natural language speakers regarding ICs seems to be that there has to be a connection between antecedent and consequent. In a probabilistic framework this connection can naturally be explained by the notion of epistemic probabilistic relevance. Surprisingly, this is ignored by the suppositionalists. Relevance measures to what extent the increasing probability of one proposition raises, lowers or leaves untouched the probability of another proposition.

In my talk I want to show that, first, with the notion of epistemic probabilistic relevance it is possible to account for the intuitions of a connection between antecedent and consequent. Second, probabilistic relevance captures the dynamics of probability distributions and thus should be understood as context change potential. Drawing on insights from current dynamic semantic frameworks and their explication of contexts, I would like to sketch a probabilistic model of discourse in which the relevance of an asserted proposition drives the discourse dynamics. In parallel to dynamic test conceptions of epistemic expressions, indicative conditionals express relevance relations, thereby providing constraints on contexts with probabilistic structure.

Key words: formal semantics, conditionals, dynamic semantics, probabilistic contexts, discourse, semantics/pragmatics

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Why is narrow content still relevant?

On the traditional Fregean view, the main reason for invoking the notion of meaning is the role it plays in the explanation of the mechanism of linguistic reference. But, since the seminal Putnam's paper (*The meaning of "meaning"*) this aim is no longer believed to be attainable. We can still talk about the "narrow content", that is content which is independent and even disjointed from the reference, but it provokes the question about its explanatory relevance. What do we need the notion of narrow content for if it lacks the main "selling point" of its predecessor (the notion of meaning)? In the paper I show some of the reasons why we still may find this notion useful, namely: its relevance for notions of "translation", "belief" and its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind and action.

Key words: narrow content, meaning theory, reference, translation, explanatory value

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The dynamics and scopes of indefinites

The most influential static analyses of indefinites (e.g. *a student, three girls*): choice/skolem function approaches (Kratzer, 1998; Reinhart, 1997, 2006; Steedman, 2007, 2012; Winter 1997, 2001) and accounts relying on domain restriction (Breheny, 2003; Schwarzschild, 2002) focus on exceptional scopal phenomena in sentences involving islands, but for the most part remain silent about how indefinites behave dynamically. The dynamic properties of indefinites, on the other hand, have been in the focus of the dominant dynamic systems (Kamp & Reyle, 1993; Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1991; van den Berg, 1996), but the coverage of these systems does not extend to the complicated array of scopal data. In my talk I will propose a new unifying type-theoretical analysis of indefinites, encompassing both the data related to their exceptional scopal behavior and the data related to their dynamic (anaphoric) properties. The proposal builds on the formal system combining generalized quantifiers (Mostowski, 1957; Lindström, 1966; Barwise & Cooper, 1981) with dependent types (Martin-Löf, 1972, 1984; Ranta, 1994; Makkai, 1995) in Grudzińska & Zawadowski (2014).

I will first introduce two key type-theoretical features of the proposal: many-sorted analysis and type dependency. The analysis is many-sorted in the sense that there are many types, i.e. quantifier phrases (e.g. *every man, most women, a student, three girls*) and predicates (e.g. *enter, like*) are interpreted over (possibly dependent) types, and not over the universe of all entities. The analysis also makes an essential use of (possibly dependent) types in modelling the dynamic aspects of indefinites. Next, I will describe and discuss a striking dichotomy in the behaviour of indefinites, and show how it can be handled in a uniform manner in our type-theoretical setting.

Key words: indefinites, exceptional scopes, dynamic behaviour, type-theoretical analysis

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Opacity of mind and metalinguistic awareness

Opacity is regularly viewed as the hallmark of the mind. Such statements as Davidson's "*semantic opacity distinguishes talk about propositional attitudes from talk of other things*" or Searle's "*every intentional act has, what I call aspectual aspect*" are well-known in philosophy. Nonetheless, the basic reason for which opacity is viewed as the key trait of the mind is noticed when it is realized that understanding of referential opacity is tied to an understanding of mind as a representational medium, and that opacity stands right at the heart of a perspectival understanding of mind. In this context, discussing opacity tasks, perspective taking tasks and alternative naming tasks developed in psychology and cognitive science, I will try to present a developmental and conceptual relation between understanding of opacity and metalinguistic awareness (i.e. an ability to evaluate statements containing alternative referring expressions). Accordingly, I will try to specify which aspects of language knowledge play a key role in the emergence of the representational understanding of mind.

Key words: mind, opacity, perspective, semantic theory, metalinguistic awareness

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Lies, damned lies, and linguistic intuitions

The purpose of this paper is to draw a parallel between the use of linguistic examples based on personal and unsubstantiated intuitions in academic papers and the use of statistics in public life and popular debate. The paper will discuss the way in which intuitions are used as evidence without backing and assertion rather than argument. This phenomenon, I shall claim, creates particular difficulties for non-native speakers who may feel unable to challenge the statements made by authors working in their own language.

The paper begins with a general discussion of the relevance and reliability of personal intuitions about language appropriacy (Devitt 2006, 2010; Culbertson & Gross 2009) and goes on to consider some claims made about usage and acceptability in various texts. A number of questionable claims made in published papers are then put to the test by use of both a survey of native speakers and a corpus search for examples of their use.

The paper concludes by discussing the relative efficacy of the two methods of empirical verification in the light of their results and considering what repercussions this may have on the practice of research in the field of linguistics.

Key words: corpus linguistics, research methodology, intuition, philosophy of linguistics, acceptability

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The demise of the first-person indexical

According to radical contextualism, word meaning can undergo syntactically unconstrained modification that affects the content of the truth-evaluable representation (Recanati 2012a,b). This perspective puts into question the distinction between indexical and non-indexical expressions (Kaplan 1989) in that all words are, in a sense, indexical. Kaplan famously distinguished expressions that have context-sensitive character allowing for fixed content (indexicals) and expressions that have fixed character, allowing for content that differs with circumstances of evaluation (non-indexicals). But Kaplan's distinction overlooks the most difficult element of the analysis of natural language meaning, namely that there are, strictly speaking, no natural-language equivalents of indexicals: indexicals are *uses of expressions* rather than expressions themselves and as such remain philosophers' fiction. For example, the role of an indexical can be played by a common noun ('Daddy (>> I) will help you'); honorification in the languages of South-East Asia demonstrates that the multiple ways of self-referring do not seem to be founded on the underlying conceptual universal (Jaszczolt forthcoming). On my analysis, indexicals do not form Kaplan's list but rather they pertain to *functions* that lexical items adopt. By extension, their characters are *dynamic*, 'fluid': they are engendered by different inferential bases in different contexts.

The question arises as to whether the fact that indexicals are philosophers' fiction poses a problem for the analysis of natural-language meaning. I conclude that it does not, but only when we adopt a stance in which unconstrained modifications are regarded as a natural step in semantic analysis rather than an exception. This problem thus sheds some light on the minimalism/contextualism debate, showing that what is to be regarded as the first-person indexical necessitates a conceptual semantics and possibly also a grammar of conceptual structures.

Key words: first-person reference, indexicality, contextualism, semantics/pragmatics interface, conceptual semantics

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Challenges to metalinguistic negotiation as disagreement

The possibility of faultless disagreement – a situation in which two speakers uttering contradicting sentences (at least on the face of it) are not wrong about what they say has been challenged by many (Stojanovic) but there have also been notable attempts to save it (MacFarlane).

In order to vindicate genuine faultless disagreement one has to explain the faultlessness of the dispute and, more importantly, to eliminate the possibility that the speakers are merely talking “past each other” – so not referring to the same object or concept – in which case the disagreement would only be apparent. An interesting path to reach this objective has been proposed by T. Sundell and D. Plunkett who identify disagreement in the discussion of taste (e.g. “Apples are tasty”, “No, they’re not”) as disagreement concerning the appropriate deployment of a linguistic expression in a context, i.e. there is a disagreement not about *apples* being tasty or not but what “tasty” *means here*. They dub this phenomenon “metalinguistic negotiation”.

In my talk I present a general outline of the discussion about the disagreements of taste and locate this solution. Further, I show why it is better than the competing views in terms of saving the possibility of some kind of permissible disagreement without the necessity of employing a radical truth relativity framework. I, however, criticize some parts of this solution, such as the fact that it does not provide the tools to distinguish which linguistic exchanges are disagreements due to metalinguistic negotiation and which are disagreements about the very matters discussed. It seems to be an important problem since even allegedly non-relative predicates may turn out to be context-sensitive. E.g. the statement saying that the door is *open* might be true or false depending on whether a cat tries to enter the house or a person in a wheelchair.

Key words: disagreement, faultless disagreement, predicates of taste, metalinguistic negotiation, context-sensitivity

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Gender normativity and auxiliary languages

This paper will explore the extent of gender normativity in auxiliary languages. Indo-European languages as a rule have gender specific pronouns, masculine normative nouns and often grammatical gender. The work of thinkers such as Irigaray, Code and Haraway has demonstrated the relationship between this linguistic phenomenon and the broader gendering on a socio-economic plane. The contribution of this paper will be to extend this theoretical framework to the comparative study of constructed auxiliary languages.

Auxiliary languages are devised languages chiefly designed to facilitate international communication between speakers of diverse first languages. A key principle in the design of auxiliary languages is the neutrality of the language with respect to specific cultural circumstances. This principle is itself somewhat paradoxical as the most successful auxiliary languages, in terms of speakers, tend to develop their own sub-culture that makes it difficult for an outsider to understand. While auxiliary languages both by design and in practice try to avoid nation and culture specific forms, it will be maintained that they tend to neglect the gender impact of the language. The central section will be composed of a comparative analysis of the use of gendered pronouns, masculine normative nouns and grammatical gender in a number of auxiliary languages such as Esperanto, Volapuk, Ido, Novial and Poliespo. The question as to the respective extent of the priority of linguistic as compared to socio-economic gender normativity will also be considered.

The paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the relevance of the findings to the broader fields of sociolinguistics and language planning. Reference will be made to the work of Corazza on the *s/he* pronoun in English and the importation of the Finnish gender neutral pronoun *hän* into Swedish.

Key words: gender, normativity, auxiliary languages, Esperanto, Volapuk

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Indexicals in proverbs

In a footnote to *Demonstratives* (1989) David Kaplan mentions a possible exception to his thesis that natural language does not contain monsters - operators that operate on character:

- (1) Never put off until tomorrow what you can do today.

Kaplan is asking rhetorically “What can one say about this?”.

Instead of addressing directly the question of the existence of monsters, I will try to answer the rhetorical question of Kaplan. I will propose an interpretation of indexicals in proverbs according to which uses of indexicals in proverbs are a special case of descriptive uses of indexicals. I dub such uses attributive uses.

Descriptive uses of indexicals are uses where indexical utterances express general propositions (see Nunberg 1993, 204; Recanati 1993, 2005; Elbourne 2005, 2008; Hunter 2010, Stokke 2010, Galery 2008, Kijania-Placek 2012). I postulate that the general interpretation is obtained by a process I call descriptive anaphora. Via the descriptive anaphoric mechanism an indexical expression inherits its semantic value from its antecedent. However, in contrast to classic anaphora, that antecedent stems from an extra-linguistic context: it is an object identified through the linguistic meaning of the pronoun (in the case of pure indexicals) or by demonstration (for demonstratives). The object is used as a pointer to a property corresponding to it in a contextually salient manner. That property contributes to the general proposition.

In typical cases of descriptive readings of indexicals, indexicals do not contribute their linguistic meaning to the proposition expressed but some other property, salient in the context. Yet it does not mean that their linguistic meaning cannot be the contributing property. In analogy to Donnellan’s attributive uses of definite descriptions, I call such descriptive uses of indexicals attributive. The main thesis of this paper is that some indexicals in proverbs exhibit attributive uses.

Key words: indexicals, proverbs, descriptive indexicals, attributive uses of indexicals

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Evolutionary grounds for relevance theory

H. P. Grice showed how, through inference, there is a conveyance of a communication beyond the conventionally coded language level. One of the most interesting modifications of Grice's approach is the relevance theory proposed by D. Sperber and D. Wilson. They accept Grice's central claim that an essential feature of most human communication is the expression and recognition of intentions. This theory argues that the hearer will search for meaning that fits his/her expectation of relevance in any given communication situation. Relevance guides not only our language usage, but all human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximisation of relevance, which is understood as a trade-off between effort and effects. In short, the human cognitive system tends to pick out information which connects to existing assumptions in such a way as to improve the individual's overall representation of the world by making it more likely to be true. While Grice assumed that inference can enrich the semantic content of the message encoded in the language, Sperber and Wilson claim that human communication is, first and foremost, a matter of inference, and that language is the add-on. In my speech, I would like to take up the issue of whether there is a reasonable, evolutionary justification for the emergence of the principle of relevance. In my presentation, I would like to raise the following question: Can relevance be an evolutionary factor, responsible for the origins of human communication?

Key words: evolution of language, communication, human cognition, inference, pragmatics, relevance theory

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**Philosophy of life in Ernest Hemingway's short story
A Clean, Well-Lighted Place: a view from cognitive poetics**

The paper analyses Ernest Hemingway's (1891-1961) philosophy of life as represented in the short story *A Clean, Well-Lighted Place* (1933). It points out its connections with existentialism and stoicism, as well as underscoring the insufficiency of the Christian myth for the writer.

The analysis employs cognitive poetics (Lakoff and Turner 1989) and axiological semantics (Krzyszowski 1993, 1997) as the methodological framework. Emphasis is laid on the theory of scripts and scenarios (Schank and Abelson 1977; Fillmore 1985) and its applications in the analysis of literary texts (Stockwell 2002). It is argued that in Hemingway's short story the scripts function as source domains of metaphors and vehicles of metonymies that serve to access the tenets of the writer's philosophy.

Key words: axiology, cognitive poetics, existentialism, script, stoicism

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Philosophy in construction grammar

The presentation describes the philosophical background of the Construction Grammar (Berkeley Construction Grammar and Fluid Construction Grammar in particular) from a formal point of view, focusing on constructions of modifiers. Philosophy of Mind raises interesting questions for semantics, while semantics along with syntax are two inseparable constituents of CxG.

We shall present the reductionist approach in the framework of Philosophy of Mind and how this approach shapes Construction Grammar. We shall also show the path from Philosophy of Mind to CxG models (from W. Quine, D. Davidson and others to Ch. Fillmore). The building blocks of CxG are not only semantics and syntactic patterns, but also philosophy. I want to focus on a problem of constructions' explications (primarily on constructions of modifiers).

A reduction of knowledge and the possibility to convert mind (or mental) schemas into language construction is commonly known to linguists and philosophers. The background of Philosophy of Mind is often mentioned in constructionists' works, however there is no systematic and comprehensive study that shows a great philosophical impact on CxG. The paper was prepared in order to show modifier constructions and to show the philosophical impact on them; especially, how reductionists approach correlates with construction of modifiers.

Key words: construction grammar, fluid construction grammar, Berkeley construction grammar, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language

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**Visual representation of complex philosophical concepts
in *Philographics* by Genis Carreras**

My talk will focus on the inventive book entitled *Philographics: Big Ideas in Simple Shapes*, described in the introduction as “a visual dictionary of philosophy, which depicts the world’s most important ‘isms’ using simple shapes and colour”. Each of the 95 philosophical concepts and schools of thought chosen by the author (e.g. “Empiricism”, “Determinism”, “Relativism”, “Dogma”, “Free will”) is represented by a single minimalistic visual symbol. The book is thus an exercise in intersemiotic translation as well as condensation: each of the pictures here is worth a thousand, but perhaps closer to a million words. It might be interesting to explore the nature of the relations between the abstract concepts, originally expounded in thick volumes of writings, and the simple shapes Carreras proposes as their representations. Are the images parasitic on the basically verbal ideas, or are they alternative realizations of the original conceptualizations? Would they be interpretable on their own, like the target texts in interlingual translation? Are they metaphorical or metonymic in nature? How has the author arrived at the particular forms? To what extent has he managed to succeed in his project? I believe it is worth asking the questions, even if definitive answers may not be easy to find.

Key words: philosophy, graphic design, intersemiotic translation, concept/word/image interaction

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The same but different

The contradictory phrase “the same but different” is often used in everyday language to express the intuition of close relationship between ideas or objects which seem strongly similar on some level, though dissimilar on others. The concept of “the same but different” may relate to variations in the construction and interpretation of the same objective scene or situation, or alternate construals: according to cognitive linguistic theory, the same objective situation may be conceptualised in a number of ways by the perceivers/speakers, which is then reflected in different linguistic forms. The phrase may also be employed in talking about variations on a theme. This notion, originating in music, assumes some source of inspiration, which gives rise to remakes or transformations. This is a very common strategy in our postmodern culture and may be observed in literature, art, music, design, advertising, and media. Constant modification, metamorphosis, recoding, is facilitated thanks to the Internet: this powerful medium enables millions of users to contribute to this phenomenon by remaking, adapting, parodying, and expanding previously existing texts.

In my paper, I would like to take a closer look at those phenomena, and the territory covered by the phrase “the same but different” and its equivalents. It would be also interesting to examine what triggers the impression of (dis)similarity and how the first and the second element of this phrase interact and balance each other. The observations will be based on a cognitive linguistic point of view, especially the perspective theory as one of the imagery dimensions (cf. Langacker 1987, 1991, 2008).

Key words: variations, cognitive linguistics, construal, conceptualisation

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Predicativism refined

Predicativism, which ultimately goes back to Burge 1973, is the view that names are predicates. The-predicativism (recently Elbourne 2005, Fara forthcoming, among others) adds to this the claim that when names occur with no overt determiner or plural morphology they are accompanied by a covert definite determiner. Names are thus definite descriptions. I argue against the-predicativism by showing that names often behave like *indefinite* descriptions, and present a theory which can account for this.

Indefinite descriptions have referential uses governed by the presupposition that the hearer not know which object the speaker is talking about: it's only appropriate to say 'A friend of mine likes kale' provided I believe you have no other way of identifying whom I'm talking about. In section 2 I make this notion precise, and show names have such uses. Indefinite descriptions have quantificational uses; in section 3, I'll show that names do too. Finally, although it's familiar in the literature that names have predicative uses when accompanied by overt indefinites, I'll show that we also get referential uses, as in 'An embattled Obama addressed congress last night'. The upshot will be that the the-predicativist's postulation of a covert definite is unmotivated. But I shall conclude by showing that predicativism can be saved with a slight refinement: following Hawthorne and Manley 2012 who themselves follow Ludlow and Segal 2004, *inter alia*, I'll suggest that there's a covert determiner with the semantics of an indefinite, but which can be spelled out either as a definite or an indefinite article.

Key words: names, predicativism, indefinites, reference

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The pragmatics of non-denoting descriptions

One dimension of the debate between Russell (1905, 1957) and Strawson (1950, 1954) over the semantics of definite descriptions (DDs) concerns the question whether existence is asserted or presupposed. Both Russell and Strawson claim to have the support of intuitions in favour of their respective views. The debate has evolved considerably since, so that the following two points have been established: (1) truth-value judgements on sentences containing non-denoting DDs do not favour uniquely one of the two theories, but exhibit a significant variation; and (2) DDs introduce a presupposition of existence, as several tests for presupposition show (see Kadmon 2001, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990, von Stechow 2004). This clearly favours Strawson's account of DDs. The task of the defender of a Frege-Strawson theory is then to account for the unfavourable intuitions. What needs an explanation is why sentences such as 'The king of France is sitting in that chair' [pointing at an empty chair] are *intuitively* false, while semantically truth-valueless. It is natural for a defender of this view to appeal to a pragmatic explanation of the intuitions. The standard explanation (Lasnik 1993, von Stechow 2004, Elbourne 2013) invokes an epistemic strategy of verification of the utterance of the sentence with respect to the relevant situation after accommodating the presupposition of existence. I raise two objections against this strategy: (i) the authors mentioned do not offer a compelling reason for the first step, that of accommodating the presupposition. And (ii) the strategy faces an overgeneration problem: similar sentences containing a non-denoting complex demonstrative are not judged intuitively as false. The same point can be made for change of state verbs (e.g. 'stop', 'begin'), as the strategy systematically makes wrong predictions. In the end, I consider introducing a constraint in order to save the account from the overgeneration problem.

Key words: definite descriptions, non-denoting, presupposition, von Stechow, epistemic strategy, intuition, pragmatics

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The sense of Frege's *Reference*

Frege, famously, treated the question "What is equality?" as one about a statement's expressing an equation. In consequence he presented a view of what signs have to 'have' as meaning, if we are able to understand them as such, as elements of statements. But, as much as Frege's claim that it is in virtue of a *sense* that terms refer has dominated much of the 20th and 21st century's thinking, the context of Frege's question of how (singular) terms can be used to refer has been mostly ignored.

I will argue that this has proven to be a mistake. Not only is the question "How do signs signify?" prominently absent in Frege's writings before the *Grundlagen*, but in "Sense and Reference" it seems to be suggested that the role of a sign is to be viewed from the perspective of what or rather how much one knows about the object the sign stands for.

So, one may assume that a term's contribution to the truth or falsity of a statement depends on some kind of description of the referent (only). Then, how an object could be a possible reference point 'outside' this very description remains unaccountable.

If not, then what was introduced in order to explicate "how are terms able to refer?" does not matter for explaining their role in respect to the truth of a whole statement .

Now, one should acknowledge that with the explanatory apparatus Frege had developed after the *Grundlagen* "depending on a description" could be read in this way: a mathematical equation, if true, can be reformulated so that a particular number gets identified in relation to what is put on the other side of a mathematical equation. Because of the very special nature of the 'object', whose possible modes of presentation are in view through the identification of a particular number, there is then no tension between both of the alternatives. There is however enough reason not to take what is an account of numbers as background against which questions of how signs are able to refer are to be asked.

Key words: Gottlob Frege, identity, sense, reference, numbers, context principle

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Linguistic modelling and science

In this paper I critique a recent claim made by Stokhof and van Lambalgen (hereafter S&vL) (2011) that linguistics and science are at odds as to the models and constructions they employ. I argue that their distinction between abstractions and idealisations, the former belonging to the methodology of science and the latter to linguistics, is not a real one. Their distinction has three prongs: (1) science is quantitative and linguistics is qualitative, (2) scientific models do not alter the ontology of the target system whereas linguistic ones do, and lastly (3) abstraction in the sciences is prompted by evidence and practicality while linguistic idealisations are prompted by ideology and theory.

I show that the majority of their arguments are flawed and the evidence they cite misleading by separately discounting the distinction through discussions of modelling practices found in scientific theory, their ontological commitments and the sociology of science. Contrary to the distinction, I argue that linguistics, like some variants of the scientific enterprise, uses a *minimalist method of idealisation* (Weisberg 2007), one which includes abstractions (as defined by S&vL) and other idealisations not uncommon to scientific model-building.

Finally, I offer an alternative account of the problems cited by S&vL by means of the modelling choices of linguists as opposed to the methods they use to define such models.

Key words: models, science, linguistics, generative grammar, formal language theory

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Does fiction make sense? Understanding fiction

My purpose is to argue that previous theories trying to give an account on truth in fiction fail and this stems from wrong starting points. A theory of truth is supposed to explain what it means to call a proposition or a sentence true and to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for truth. Most of the attempts to do this task get into trouble when we are referring to nonexistent objects like Sherlock Holmes. In addition, the previous theories on truth in fiction underestimate matters stemming from literary theory, namely questions on interpretation and intertextuality. They are essential in order to give an account of truth and understanding of fiction. The theory I present states that the use theory of meaning and the minimal theory of truth together offer solutions to the problems we are facing when trying to judge and understand fiction. The account I am offering aims to do justice to both our common sense view on truth in fiction and scientific worry on truth. I claim that much of the difficulty to overcome is due to misconceptions concerning the nature of truth and a tendency to construct possible or fictional worlds in order to solve the puzzles. What makes fiction make sense, is that it is understandable only in connection to the world we live in. I claim that understanding fiction consists in knowledge of the uses of words which makes it possible to recognize different contexts or language games. The one who recognizes them can perform semantic ascents by using the concept of truth. This makes it possible to give an adequate account on function of truth in complicated contexts where reality and fiction are intermingled and references to other fictions are made. This approach also implies that the popular idea of pretence in dealing with fiction is no longer decisive.

Key words: fiction, truth, understanding, minimalism, use theory of meaning, make believe

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**Methodological reflections on academic and experimental philosophy:
the case of the omissions account of the Knobe effect and the Butler problem**

The purpose of the talk is to draw some methodological consequences from my omissions account of the Knobe effect and Butler problem both for academic philosophy and experimental philosophy.

I show how one can use the normativist theory of intentional omissions (intentional omission to ϕ is knowing failure to do one's duty to ϕ) to explain a number of philosophical puzzles about the concept of intentional action. In particular, the Knobe effect and the Butler problem manifest anomalous intentionality attributions: (a) the peculiar intentionality attributions occur only against a normative background, and (b) they presuppose a belief rather than an intention on the part of the agent. The normativist theory of intentional omission (a) presupposes normative background and (b) requires knowledge (awareness) rather than intention for intentionality. In Knobe's and Butler's cases, people who are inclined to say " α intentionally ϕ ed" in effect claim that α intentionally omitted not to ϕ . (The latter description contains a hidden double negation. There is a subtly invalid argument form that allows one to transform the latter into the former).

There are thus reasons to believe that ' α intentionally ϕ s' is systematically ambiguous between an ascription of an intentional action of ϕ ing (a default attribution) and an ascription of an intentional omission not to ϕ (when there is a reasonable expectation on α not to ϕ). The omissions account in particular undermines the claim that experimental philosophy can tell us what people's intuitions really are. To the contrary, the Knobe effect, which was supposed to uncover people's real intuitions about the concept of intentional action, is not even about intentional actions! However, I also argue that academic philosophers have been far too complacent in their reluctance to tackle the Knobe effect, which has been academically intuited by Harman (1976).

Key words: Butler problem, intention, intentional action, intentional omission, knowledge, Knobe effect

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Discourse properties of the reference system for coding spatial information in Hausa

Hausa is an African language spoken in the Sahel-Sahara zone of West Africa. The paper investigates its reference system which allows defining of the location of an object. Three types of expressions are used to demonstrate the oppositional structures: FRONT – BACK, as in ‘front/back of the house’, LEFT – RIGHT, as in ‘left/right side’, and HERE – THERE in the function of space adverbials. Lexical equivalents of these notions (*gaba – baya*; (*hannun*) *hagu – (hannun) baya*, and *nan – can* respectively) are not transparent in coding the spatial relation. The contextual analysis of these exponents indicates that the use of a particular (word) expression (e.g. the choice between *baya* and *gaba*) is determined by a point of reference which enables identifying the spatial relation within the structural frame.

The data are taken from written sources which record Hausa oral literature. The following points of reference have been identified:

Person-oriented reference (the ‘referent’ is a person)

Contextually marked reference (e.g. the ‘referent’ is distinguished by its size or by its significance)

Point-of-view reference (the ‘referent’ is either a speaker or a hearer)

The examples are given with their contextual setting. They are to show that reference is not a feature of grammar but rather a category of discourse and communication.

Key words: reference, spatial relation, location, discourse, Hausa

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Semiotics of ontological quanta

A granular semiotics originating from L. Zadeh and independently from B. Rieger is interpreted in terms of quantum complementarity: it can be also obtained from the classical Saussure scheme if the signified and the signifier are complementary to each other. The “twins” of language and reality are merged into a single ontology of quanta, which can be interpreted complementarily either as “words” (i.e. units of meanings in the language) or as “things” (i.e. units of reality). That granular semiotics can be formalized by the formalism of quantum information in Hilbert spaces whether non-entangled (and thus equivalent to a single one) or entangled.

The language in terms of ontological quanta abandons and darkens all dividing the human beings. Those quanta might be called invariant to the different intellect and experience of the humans. The linguistic “atoms” are able to concentrate only on a few unifying features of reality as their meaning. Those linguistic units are “live beings” “fed” by consensus and therefore created to search for it and find its “deposits”. Consequently the language is a map of “treasures” of consensus elaborated by living linguistic “cells”. The ontological quanta are those “living words” “fed” by consensus and creating the map of reality as the locations of its deposits.

Any meaning consists in the optimal proportion between its unclearness and exactness. The existence of ontological quanta forces the picture to be granular as a principle. The indivisibility of the ontological quanta is the condition for them to behave as “living” and searching for “deposits” of consensus. The ontological quanta are bigger, the picture is grainier, but the attraction between the quanta is stronger and the “deposits” of consensus are more visible. They are “living” and “moving” thus re-outlining new “deposits” of consensus, i.e. new meanings.

Key words: Zadeh, Rieger, granular semiotics, ontological quanta, quantum semiotics

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Are folk semantic intuitions relevant to arguments from reference?

In a much-discussed pair of recent papers, Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich (“MMNS”) present a powerful critique of what they call arguments from reference. These arguments from reference are characterised as “arguments that derive philosophically significant conclusions from the assumption of one or another theory of reference”. The critique proceeds in three stages. First, MMNS present evidence that there is cross-cultural variation in semantic intuitions. Second, MMNS argue that such cross-cultural variation undermines the standard methodology used in theorising about reference. Third, it is concluded that, without an acceptable methodology for theorising about reference, the assumption of any particular theory of reference—a key assumption in any argument from reference—is unjustified. If the critique is successful, then arguments from reference fail.

The critique has given rise to a great deal of discussion, which has focused around the first and second stages of the critique. In this paper, however, I take issue with the third stage: even without an acceptable methodology for theorising about reference, once can be justified in using arguments from reference.

In order to establish this conclusion, I distinguish between two projects. The first, which I call the natural language project, is a descriptive project that seeks to understand and explain human language. The second, which I call the interpretive project, is a normative project that recommends interpreting words and sentences in one way or another for the purpose of understanding some particular human activity. I will show that, to the extent that the methodological problems raised by MMNS are serious, they are only serious from the perspective of the natural language project. And, importantly, arguments from reference are effective even when construed from the perspective of the interpretive project. It follows that – regardless of the outcome of the debate surrounding the first and second stages of the critique – MMNS’s critique of arguments from reference fails.

Key words: reference, intuitions, experimental philosophy, semantics, methodology

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Semantic problems of relevance theory

Theory of relevance functions in two aspects. On the one hand, it is a theory of language that attempts to create a new idea of meaning of words and sentences as well as a new demarcation line between semantics and pragmatics. In this sense, theory of relevance aims to connect meaning conceived in a traditional, semantic manner with such pragmatic factors as intention of the speaker, utterance context and communication aim. On the other hand, relevance theory is a quasi-psychological theory which attempts to describe the process of communication on the basis of some mental facts that occur in the minds of the speaker and the receiver in the act of communication. In this sense, theory of relevance aims at becoming an empirical theory that could be verified in an experimental way.

In my presentation, I will try to prove that although relevance theory could be an interesting proposal in the quasi-psychological field, it is useless for the philosophy of language. My statement is based on the fact that relevance theory does not offer adequate tools to describe the meaning of words and, moreover, it neither can analyze tautologies and contradictions nor properly explain logical interference. My presentation is, therefore, about the semantic thesis of relevance theory, not about its adequacy as a theory dealing with the psychological process of communication. It is possible that relevance theory accurately grasps mental facts occurring in the speaker's mind during an act of communication, since plenty of arguments show that it is the case. However, success in the field of psychology does not correspond with success in the field of philosophy. Therefore, the author of this presentation, though favourable toward relevance theory, claims that its followers should pay more attention to the semantic core of the theory in question or leave it just in the area of quasi-psychology.

Key words: ambiguity, contradiction, equivocation, meaning, mental fact, relevance theory, tautologies

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Re-reading Kripke's normativity argument

In the recent debates about normativity of meaning (and content) both normativists and anti-normativists assumed that in order for Kripke's argument to be successful it must prove that normativity of meaning shares some similarities with ethical normativity. We offer a different reading of this argument, which aims to show that even with no such assumption, any form of factualism about meaning is false. We take every form of factualism to have two characteristics: first, it identifies correctness of the application of a rule with possession of the preferred special quality during the application. Secondly, factualism is understood as a definitional claim, hence it has an a priori status. These characteristics allow us to construct (using the apparatus of modal logic of conceivability and apriority) a semi-formal proof, which shows that under the assumptions of fallibility of rule following, every theory which offers sufficient conditions of accurate application of a rule is conceivably wrong.

A weakened version of factualism would claim that following the rule is not identifiable a priori with the said special property, but their identity is a posteriori truth. This last thesis seems to be implicit in Alan Gibbard's recent account of normativity of meaning. According to Gibbard, although we cannot define meaning in terms of dispositions, meaning properties are to be a posteriori identified with dispositional properties. This, however, seems to be not sufficiently motivated. On our reading, Kripke's argument shows certain similarities to the open question argument in metaethics. Kripke can be seen as saying that whichever Ψ one chooses, there is still a room to make a question of the form "This use of language has feature Ψ but is it rule-following?"

Key words: meaning, normativity, factualism, dispositionalism

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Compositionality in constraint-based linguistic theories

The aim of this presentation is to discuss the validity of the principle of compositionality – usually attributed to Frege, but probably originating from Carnap (1947) (cf. Jansen 2012) – in the context of modern linguistic theories. A careful formulation of this principle, as assumed in linguistics, may be found in Szabó (2012:79): “The meaning of a complex expression is determined by its immediate structure and the meanings of its immediate constituents.” Such a principle is assumed axiomatically in the dominant linguistic paradigm associated with the name of Noam Chomsky, but – as discussed in detail in Szabó (2012) – there are no strong fundamental arguments for adopting it.

Such a formulation of the compositionality principle makes one crucial assumption, namely, that the main syntactic structure is a constituency tree (cf. “immediate constituents”). This is so in Chomsky's transformational grammars, but not in modern constraint-based theories, such as Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG; Pollard and Sag 1994) or Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG; Dalrymple 2001), where the main (LFG) or only (HPSG) data structure is a possibly deeply nested feature structure. It has been suggested (Halvorsen 1995, Crouch and van Genabith 1999) that, in such theories, the notion of compositionality should be weakened to the notion of systematicity, “where the meaning of a sentence depends on the meanings of its words and the way these are combined, but where syntactic structure and lexical semantics may not fully specify either” (Crouch and van Genabith 1999:122).

In this presentation we show that 1) this notion of systematicity is very close to Frege's principle of contextuality and that 2) its employment in formal linguistic theories makes it possible to significantly simplify both the syntactic component and the semantic module, moving semantic complexity to where it belongs: in the lexical entries of semantically complex items.

Key words: compositionality, formal linguistics, constraint-based theories, distributivity, Lexical Functional Grammar

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Linguistic and philosophical approaches to NPN and (P)NPN structures

This paper is concerned with NPN structures exemplified by *day by day* or *student after student* and apparently related (P)NPN forms such as *from cover to cover* or *from start to finish*. The analysis of these expressions needs to address a number of challenges, some of which have been tackled in the relevant literature in linguistic (e.g. Pi 1995; Travis 2001, 2003; Jackendoff 2008, Haik 2013) or philosophical (e.g. Beck & von Stechow 2007; Zwarts 2013) terms. A particularly problematic aspect of NPN and some (P)NPN structures is the relation between a kind of formal doubling or reduplication (at least in the case of NPNs with two identical nouns) and semantic plurality or iteration. In more general terms, the nature of the relation between formal reduplication and semantic iteration bears on the roles of syntax and semantics in the overall architecture of language, an issue of interest for both linguists and philosophers of language.

The aim of the discussion is to investigate whether insights from earlier fragmentary analyses can be put together to yield a more comprehensive account of all types of NPN and (P)NPN structures, which, on a more general plane, may demonstrate that linguistics and philosophy of language can inform one another.

Key words: syntax, semantics, nominal expressions, nouns, prepositions, reduplication

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Nominal description theory and modal argument

According to the nominal description theory (NDT), also called metalinguistic theory of proper names, the meaning of proper name N is identical with the meaning of the corresponding nominal (or metalinguistic) description “the only x named ‘N’”. The theory is thus at odds with the popular direct reference theory of proper names which denies nontrivial semantic content of proper names. However, a Kripke-style argumentation against NDT by means of Kripkean modal argument can be doubted e.g. because proper names are introduced by means of contingent baptizing acts, in consequence of which they share semantic behaviour with nominal descriptions. I suggest refinements of the modal argument which can filter out such objections. The crucial distinctions are framed in (hyper)intensional logic. I distinguish two kinds of nominal descriptions: rigid and non-rigid. Then, there arise two versions of the modal argument against NDT, both valid. But one of them has a conclusion targeted against NDT, the truth of which remains disputable. To make the argument sound, I replace Kripke’s thesis about rigidity of proper names by a stronger semantic thesis. Still, our modal argument does not disprove NDT; for which one should use semantic argument.

Key words: nominal description theory, metalinguistic theory of proper names, modal argument, descriptions, proper names, intensional semantics

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Who's Mum?

The reference of referential terms is frequently taken to be determined by their semantics. For instance, in the case of proper names, prominent contemporary theories take the semantics of a name either to be constituted by its reference (e.g. Sainsbury, 2013), or to be a function from certain determinate contextual parameters to a referent (e.g. Pelczar & Rainsbury, 1997). Many accounts of indexicals state that each indexical has a determinate semantic character that, given certain contextual parameters, returns a referent (Kaplan, 1989). On all these accounts, there is a sense in which the semantics of the terms is determining its reference. If context is involved in the determination, the way in which it affects reference determination is stipulated by the semantics. In this is paper, I defend the view that there are at least some referential terms whose reference is not determined by their semantics, but is determined wholly by contextual factors in a manner which cannot be accounted for by determinate Kaplanian characters, nor other semantic criteria. Specifically, I claim that familial terms such as 'Mum', when used as bare referential terms, have their reference determined, on an occasion of use, wholly pragmatically. I argue that, though there is generally a connection between the referent of 'Mum' and motherhood, this can't be accounted for by any simple semantic character. Anecdotal evidence is presented suggesting that 'Mum' need not refer to the speaker's mother, nor to the addressee's mother, nor even anything like the most contextually salient mother, although of course, in the right contexts, it will refer to these. I observe how various pragmatic factors can affect the reference of 'Mum'. Finally, I discuss how consideration of 'Mum' and 'Dad' might lead us to think that the reference of other terms, particularly proper names, is determined wholly pragmatically.

Key words: philosophy of language, reference, semantics, pragmatics, context, character, 'Mum'

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On the very idea of predicate reference

In *Truth and Predication* (2005) Donald Davidson argues against the idea of explaining the semantical role of predicates in terms of the notion of *reference*. He shows at length in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum* that such approaches fail to explain the difference between a mere list of names and a sentence. For a sentence exhibits a unity, which is a condition for sentences being either true or false. If one insists and tries to get along with *reference*, Davidson argues that “*it will always lead to an infinite regress*” (Davidson 2005: 143).

In my talk I deal with two objections Tyler Burge raised against Davidson’s line of reasoning. In order to show that Davidson does not provide good reasons against the idea that predicates refer to entities such as properties or functions, Burge accuses Davidson of confusing “*writing about sentences*” with “*writing about facts*” (Burge 2007: 592): the infinite regress does not occur, if, according to Burge, one sticks with facts, for “*circularity and regress are properties of explanations, [...] not of ordinary facts of subject matters*” (ibid.). The second objection is closely connected with this and Burge’s reading of Frege’s functional account of predication. He claims that Davidson ignores the distinction between *singular term reference* and *predicate reference*, which does not impede the understanding of a sentence as a unity.

In order to reject Burge’s first objection, I am going to focus on the structure of Davidson’s argument, showing thereby that Burge’s objection misses the point of Davidson’s argument. In the second part, I dwell on the notion of *predicate reference*. From the assumption of a distinction between *singular term reference* and *predicate reference* I elaborate the conditions for the understanding of predicates as part of sentences and the entities they are supposed to refer to predicatively, arguing thereby that the notion of *predicate reference* remains unintelligible.

Key words: reference, predicate reference, predication, function, facts, unity of proposition

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Attributive descriptions and non-existential interpretation

In my talk, I am going to present and defend a “non-Russellian” theory of attributive definite descriptions, which, nevertheless, preserves the idea that these descriptions ought to be represented as quantifiers of natural language. The presented theory is based on the version of the quantificational account proposed by Neale (1990), as it employs the analysis of subject-predicate statements (i.e., “The *F* is *G*”) in terms of restricted quantification. Nonetheless, it steps away from both Neale’s and Russell’s vital assumption that such sentences *assert the existence* of the object satisfying the description – or, in other words, it denies that descriptions have “existential import”.

During the presentation I will outline a formal system in which the proposed semantic theory is designed and state my main theses. Afterwards, I will present some evidence for the advocated theory, which will be two-fold. Firstly, I will argue that the theory is supported by various observations concerning natural language (i.e. discourses involving fictional objects) and also by some experimental research on quantifiers in general (see: Spychalska 2009). Secondly, I will argue that my quantificational account can challenge serious objections against the standard (Russellian) theory of descriptions, raised in some recent papers. The first objection concerns the interpretation of descriptions embedded in the scope of non-doxastic propositional operators (Elbourne 2010, Schoubye 2013). The second one points to a difficulty in providing an adequate reading for complex statements of existence on Russell’s account (i.e. “The village of hobbits – portrayed by Tolkien in his novel – does not exist”; cf. Kroone 2009.) I will argue that once we divorce the quantificational account from the Russellian claim that descriptions assert existence, the aforementioned constructions pose no more problems to a theoretical analysis.

Key words: attributive descriptions, quantifiers, existential import, statements of existence, non-doxastic attitude operators

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Vagueness, contingency and assessment-sensitivity

Predicates like ‘tall’ in (1) are notoriously recalcitrant to formal semantic treatments as they show the puzzling properties of vagueness: borderline cases, lack of clear boundaries, susceptibility to the Sorites paradox.

(1) John is tall.

Recently, several authors have argued that such properties typically go hand in hand with context-sensitivity and developed accounts that aim at tracing back vagueness to parameters of the context of use. However, such ‘contextualist’ theories of vagueness (Raffman 1994, Fara 2000, Shapiro 2006,) have encountered forceful objections on the ground that, allegedly, vagueness and context-dependence are demonstrably independent phenomena: hold the context fixed – so the objection goes – vagueness still arises. Such a simple reasoning seems to downgrade the link between vagueness and context-dependence to the level of “an empirical correlation, not an a priori law” (Williamson 1994: 214).

I argue that this conclusion is not correct. I show that the presumed force of the objection is based on a restrictive understanding of the notion of context. Particularly, I develop a new approach according to which, in order to make sense of the idea that vagueness is a form of context-sensitivity, we need to acknowledge that the context-dependence of vague words is two-fold: besides sensitivity to the context of use, vague words also show a previously unrecognised form of context-sensitivity, i.e. MacFarlane’s (2003) assessment-sensitivity. I propose that expanding the operative notion of context so as to include the new dimension of the context of assessment allows the building of a version of the contextualist story that is immune to the standard objection. Particularly, building on the analogy between vagueness and future contingents, I argue that the assessment-sensitive semantics helps capture the seemingly incompatible intuitions about the meaning of vague words. At the same time, it explains why the Sorites paradox is logically invalid but psychologically so compelling.

Key words: vagueness, context-sensitivity, contextualism, relativism, assessment-sensitivity, Sorites paradox

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On the meanings of performative propositions used by traders

Traders buying and selling stocks, bonds, commodities, derivatives, etc. appeal to propositions which are called performative propositions in philosophy of language. Meanings of those propositions vary in the contexts of different situations. For example, the meaning of the proposition 'I sell asset X ' varies in the following contexts: (i) at a loss relative to the price at which assets were purchased, rational investors are likely to sell assets; (ii) the individual investors (they are usually irrational) prefer to sell assets which have gone up in value relative to their purchase price. So, meanings of performative propositions used by traders depend on contexts and can change in time. For example, investors in their forecasts might be optimistic, while at other times, they might be pessimistic. The point is that with the lapse of time investors can build different families of intensions as the meaning of a phenomenon. For instance, under conditions of investor exuberance, entrepreneurs prefer to create closed-end funds, because they forecast that they can sell fund shares for more than they are worth. These conditions are contexts for one family of meanings of performative propositions connected to closed-end funds. Nevertheless, there can be other families as well, e.g. conditions, where a closed-end fund is being liquidated. Then investors forecast that at liquidation, the fund price will equal net asset value. In the paper I propose a theory of meanings of performative propositions used by traders. This theory is based on the Austinian-style semantics and assumes self-reference.

Key words: performative proposition, Austinian-style semantics, self-reference, speech act, illocutionary force

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**Simple, probabilistic, true – the new version of probabilistic semantics
for simple conditionals**

The aim of my speech is to offer a new version of probabilistic semantics for simple conditionals. Contrary to the traditional version (developed by Ernest Adams and presented in his “The logic of conditionals”) it assigns truth values to conditionals. Thanks to that difference I will be able to generalize truth conditions over the cases of conditionals embedded in non-conditional contexts and assign probabilities to conditionals in a natural and trivialization-free way. Then, I will use the assigned probabilities to incorporate compound conditionals (conditionals with conditionals as arguments).

My presentation will be divided into four parts: firstly I will introduce some notions which will be useful for the whole speech. Secondly, I will present the new version of the theory – the general truth conditions (TC) and notions of probability distributions. The third part will be devoted to the problem of compound conditionals, I will present the classic attempt to capture them, the so-called Stalnaker thesis and show why it doesn't work, and then I will define the generalization of a notion of the probability distribution which will open the possibility to apply the TC to compound conditionals. The fourth and final part will be devoted to some of the implications of my theory e.g. failure of some of the instances of Modus Ponens.

Key words: simple conditionals, probabilistic semantic, embedded conditionals, probability of conditionals, truth conditions.

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Is minimal semantics (im)practical?

The theory of minimal semantics and liberal truth conditions developed by Emma Borg is a brave attempt to defend semantics from an overflow of pragmatic theories. An overflow that is necessary because of the need to cope with 'unarticulated constituents'. Nevertheless, a fully-fledged theory of language must be one that explains the evolutionary riddle that we call human communication. The idea of liberal truth conditions is undoubtedly an interesting intellectual experiment. However, the propositions generated through this account are underdetermined and unintuitive. Moreover, the theory fails to provide an account of basic constituents of a natural language such as possessive constructions. Therefore, in order to avoid its scientific rejection, we need to seek a different field of practical application of the idea. Legal interpretation is an interesting hypothetical field because its principal theories have as common denominator - the notion of 'literal meaning'. This notion has very much in common with the Borgian 'liberal truth conditions' at a conceptual level. Moreover, facetious uses of language, or manipulation in advertising also seem to exploit the Borgian idea. Finally, courtroom interactions typical for common law systems such as witness cross-examination could be another potential area of application. Liberal truth conditions may be far less abstract than language theorists claim.

Key words: minimal semantics, liberal truth conditions, literal meaning, legal interpretation, pragmatics

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**An empirical contribution to aspect-modality interaction studies:
negated *must* and verbal aspect in American English**

The proposed paper deals with modality as a linguistic phenomenon. With its roots in logic, modality has also become a subject of linguistic research. Earlier studies on modality focus predominantly on typologizing various modal expressions in numerous natural languages. The present study, however, suggests a different approach. This is so because the attempted subject of investigation is the interaction of the semantic field of modality with negation and aspect. In the proposed paper the said phenomenon is exemplified with the negated form of the English modal verb *must*.

Initially, the article introduces the topic of linguistic modality. This is followed by a description of the model of the three-dimensional semantic field of modal expressions (Kratzer 1991), which is reviewed with its application to typologizing linguistic modality. This leads to certain methodological remarks as far as the types of modality are concerned, and the division into ROOT and EPISTEMIC modal readings is presented. The aforesaid theoretical considerations are further tested with the use of concordance analyses based on the *Corpus of Contemporary American English*. With this methodology, instances of matrix predicates including the negated modal verb *must (not)* are excerpted and examined. Eventually, attempts are made to unveil how clausal negation and verbal aspect combined influence modal readings of the studied modal verb (Abraham 2008, Kotin 2012).

Key words: modality, semantic field, negation, aspect-modality interaction

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**Reflection on some of the issues of rationalist
philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. Remarks on the margins
of *A philosophical discourse concerning speech* by Gerould de Cordemoy**

The deliberations contained herein concern the issues touched upon in a short work entitled *A philosophical discourse concerning speech* written by Gerould de Cordemoy (1626-1684), a French philosopher and thinker who – in his own words – was a firm believer in the philosophy of Descartes and claimed to be a Cartesian. Apart from *Logic and Grammar from Port-Royal*, Cartesian literature of the 17th century does not present a single other separate work devoted to the philosophy of language and the properties of speech. Aside from several interesting topics discussed by the author, one particular issue deserves special attention – namely, the occasionalistic interpretation of the mechanism of human communication. Still, this concept does not tower over other issues which, when reflected upon within the framework of Cartesian doctrine, gain new meaning in the context of contemporary discussion on the phenomenon of speech, its ontogenesis, and social functions. These include Cordemoy's thoughts on the social aspects of language and the mechanism of speech acquisition in children.

Key words: Gerould de Cordemoy, rationalist philosophy of mind, occasionalism, social aspects of language, language acquisition in children

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Alien properties and impossible worlds

Some modal theorists advocate such a conception of impossible worlds according to which (i) impossible worlds must be ersatz worlds; (ii) possibilities and impossibilities must be represented referentially, rather than descriptively and (iii) each merely possible particular, property and relation requires a distinct name (e.g. Jago 2013). In order to avoid ontological extravagance, they postulate positive and negative facts by means of which they represent the so-called alien properties.

I argue that the approach falls short in representing certain alien properties. Namely, I will show that this approach faces the same problems as linguistic ersatzism does. For, by definition, there are alien natural properties instantiated in other worlds and there is no way to introduce names for them. Granted, such an approach provides for alien properties like having $\frac{1}{4}$ charge, but this does not imply that we can reason for every fundamental alien property. It is due to the fact that some instances of alien properties are not instantiated in the actual world and their instantiation (or lack of it) does not contribute to the property construction.

Finally, I present an alternative approach according to which possible and impossible worlds are genuine worlds and alien natural properties (or universals) are only instantiated in them.

Key words: modality, alien properties, impossible worlds, representation, modal realism

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Saving uniqueness

I present a theory of referential uses of definite descriptions that is an alternative to Neale's (2004, 2008) theory of Gödelian completions but nonetheless assumes two tenets of Neale's view:

- (i) the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions is basically correct, i.e. definite descriptions are not referring nor ambiguous expressions;
- (ii) referential uses are not to be explained in terms of the Gricean distinction between what is expressed and what is meant.

On Neale's view, referential uses of definite descriptions invite Gödelian completions. On a referential use, the definite description '[the x : Fx]' is completed into the Gödelian completion '[the x : Fx & $x = \alpha$]', where ' α ' is a singular term that refers to an object. The point is that whenever one completes '[the x : Fx]' into the Gödelian completion '[the x : Fx & $x = \alpha$]', one loses the implication that there is only one F . The quantificational meaning of '[the x : Fx & $x = \alpha$]' implies that there is only one object that is F and is identical to α , and this is compatible with there being more than one object that is F . Therefore, the Gödelian completion cancels the uniqueness condition of the quantificational meaning of the original definite description.

Contrary to Neale's theory of Gödelian completions, the theory I present preserves the uniqueness condition of the quantificational meaning of definite descriptions as a contribution to the proposition expressed on referential uses. I show why this is a remarkable advantage of the theory I defend over Neale's theory of Gödelian completions. Moreover, Neale maintains that referential uses are a special case of the phenomenon of incompleteness of quantified NPs insofar as referential interpretations stem from Gödelian *completions* of definite descriptions. I agree with Devitt (2004, 2007) that Gödelian completions are Russellian only in a technical but not substantive sense, because they cancel the uniqueness condition of the quantificational meaning of definite descriptions. I argue that the mechanism that underlies referential interpretations of definite descriptions is different from the mechanism that yields completions of quantified NPs. I show then that these mechanisms are distinct although they can be complementary.

Key words: definite descriptions, referential uses, Gödelian completions, semantics, pragmatics, contextualism.

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The inclusive and exclusive interpretation of plural nouns

Since Link (1983) singular NPs are assumed to refer within the domain of atoms, e.g. the denotation of *girl* is $\{a, b, c\}$ where $a, b,$ and c are atomic individuals of the model. On the other hand, plural NPs are assumed to refer either within the domain of sums (exclusive interpretation; plurality means *more than one*), e.g. the plural term *girls* denotes $\{a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c\}$ (Chierchia 1998), or within the domain of sums and atoms (inclusive interpretation; plurality means *one or more*), e.g. *girls* denote $\{a, b, c, a+b, a+c, b+c, a+b+c\}$. The first analysis is accurate in upward-entailing contexts, e.g. *John has children* is true if John has two children or more. However, it seems to fail to explain behavior of plural NPs in downward-entailing environments, e.g. *John doesn't have children* is not true if John has one child. This fact led Sauerland et al. (2005) to propose that the plural is semantically unmarked and its interpretation results from the competition of forms.

In this paper I confront arguments for and against both the inclusive and exclusive interpretation of plural nouns. I examine pluralia tantum which are systematically ambiguous between singular and plural readings and hence seem to be challenging for the exclusive account. On the other hand, I address the heterogeneous behavior of bare plurals which can denote either objects, e.g. *Dogs are in the park*, or kinds, e.g. *Dogs are mammals*. The use of the kind plural can explain the supposed inclusive interpretation of plural terms in downward-entailing contexts (Grimm 2013). An additional argument in favor of the exclusive interpretation comes from the semantics of the measure word *pair* in phrases with regular count nouns and pluralia tantum, e.g. *pair of students* denotes $\{a+b, a+c, b+c\}$ while *pair of trousers* denotes $\{a, b, c\}$.

Key words: plurality; number; inclusive interpretation; exclusive interpretation; semantics

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Weakened compositionality and a unified semantics of quotation

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it is to present some problems arising with quotation that put the standard compositionality into question. Second, it is to defend a program for semantics proposed in Pagin & Westerståhl 2010

First, the following problems are to be discussed:

- (a) Quotation-functors yield intensional contexts;
- (b) According to a context, quotation may or may not be treated as an atom.

Second, I propose to combine and modify two independent concepts. Syntactically, I adopt Zwart's (2011, 2014) top-down approach to syntax, according to which each derivation D has the form of a set of subsequent layers (D_1, \dots, D_n), each D_i having its own numeration N_i . Crucially, the elements of a given N_i are defined as a product of some previous derivation D_{i-1} . Consequently, units that are complex at one stage D_i can be treated as simple at a higher D_{i+1} . Semantically, I argue for the program proposed in Pagin & Westerståhl 2010, where the standard compositionality is relativised to linguistic context type. In the weakened account the interpretation function takes yet another argument standing for the context type that specifies the denotation, but not the syntactic category.

I argue that the type of the context must be specified in the course of derivation by merging a given phrase with Context^0 . ContextP serves as a partial instruction for semantics: it specifies an equivalence class represented by a given set of phonological features (F_{phon}) assigned a particular syntactic label. In the case of quotational context, the equivalence relation ranges not over extensions assigned to F_{phonS} , but over another set $\{F'_{phon}, F''_{phon}, \dots\}$ represented by the F_{phon} :

Key words: compositionality, quotation, intensional contexts, linguistic context, use-mention distinction

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Phatic meaning, token-reflexive content and deictical intentions.

An Austinian account of demonstrative acts

John L. Austin distinguished between two aspects of “the total speech act in the total speech situation” (Austin 1975:148): locutionary and illocutionary. To perform an locutionary act is to produce a linguistic representation of a worldly state; to make an illocutionary act, in turn, is to commit oneself in a certain way to the truth of the representation produced.

In this paper I adopt the framework of speech act theory and use it to develop an Austinian account of demonstrative acts. Following Austin, I distinguish between the phatic act and the rhetic act, i.e., between “the act of uttering certain vocables or words, i.e., noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary” (Austin 1975: 92) and the act of using those vocables or words “with a certain more or less definite ‘sense’ and a more or less definite ‘reference’” (Austin 1975: 93). Next, I make the following three claims. First, there is a type of meaning – that I call the *phatic meaning* – that can be ascribed to a linguistic token produced by a phatic act in virtue of its lexical and grammatical properties only (see Witek 2015b; cf. Witek 2015a); in other words, the phatic meaning of the speaker’s act is determined by the rules of the lexical and compositional semantics of the language she speaks. Second, the phatic meaning of an utterance can be identified with what Korta and Perry (2007, 2011) and García-Carpintero (1998, 2000, 2001) call its token-reflexive content. Third, the referential aspect of the locutionary meaning of the utterance is determined by the speaker’s directing or deictical intention (see Bach 1987, 1992; Perry 2001; García-Carpintero 1998) that underlies her act of demonstration.

Key words: demonstration, directing (deictical) intentions, Austin, phatic meaning, semantics/pragmatics interface

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**On naming, causality and scientism apropos of
Kripke's theory of reference and natural kind terms**

In philosophy of language the semantics of names has been traditionally concerned with the problem of reference as one of its main conundra, i.e., how are our words and thoughts connected to the entities and objects about which we talk and think? This concern has been traditionally tackled from two main perspectives: the causal theory of reference (in order to correctly assign references to the speaker's words, events in the causal history of a speaker's use of the term, including when the term was first acquired, must be considered) and descriptivist theories (the reference of a term is fixed by the kind of properties or descriptions which the speaker associates with that term). In this essay I shall deploy Putnam's (1975) distinction between 'the contribution of the environment' and 'the contribution of society' in order to show that Kripke's causal theory of reference (1980) can be undermined from at least two flanks, namely: (i) constructive empiricism (Ban Fraassen, 1980, 2003) and (ii) anti-scientism (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1953; Horwich, 2012). I will conclude that the extra strength of Kripke's causal link over a non-causal theory of reference is illusory (for it is based on an unjustified abductive inference, inflationary metaphysics and poor grammar), something which I shall argue, is more blatant (yet not necessarily less true) in the case of biological natural kind terms (Foucault, 1963, 1972, 1979, 1980; Malt, 1994; Laporte, 2004) than it is in the case of chemical natural kind terms (Malt, *ibid.*; Van Brakel, 2000; Ban Fraassen, 1980,2003; Weisberg, 2003; VadeWall, 2007; Chang, 2012).

Key words: Kripke, natural kind terms, causality, scientism, grammatical fictions.

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Relativism and the multi-perspectivity of predicates of personal taste

Sentences containing predicates of personal taste (expressions like “fun”, “tasty” etc.) have been taken to be context-sensitive, in the broad sense that utterances of the same sentence can differ in truth value across contexts, but also perspectival – that is, that (part of) the explanation of this variation in truth-value is that their truth depends on perspectives. A less mentioned feature of such sentences is what I call multi-perspectivity: the fact that for sentences that contain two or more predicates of personal taste, there are interpretations of those sentences for which two or more perspectives are needed. To illustrate, although the more widespread reading of the sentence

John had a fun ride and a tasty dish

is that the ride was fun and the dish tasty for John, a reading is available according to which the ride was fun for John but the dish for the speaker, or for someone else (or vice-versa).

It has been claimed that this phenomenon creates trouble for relativism about predicates of personal taste (the view that the perspectives on which the truth of sentences containing such predicates depends are part of the circumstances of evaluation, and not of their content). In this paper I investigate how exactly the trouble arises. I start with an objection that Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) have raised against Kölbel’s (2009) view in connection to simple sentences like the one above. Then I scrutinize Lasersohn’s (2008) view – the only relativist that has addressed this phenomenon – in connection to complex sentences like “Every man gave a woman a fun ride and a tasty dish”. While I conclude that neither theory handles the phenomenon adequately, I claim that this is only a limitation of the two versions considered, and not of relativism in general. To this effect, I sketch a different relativist view and show how it can accommodate multi-perspectivity.

Key words: predicates of personal taste, relativism, perspective, multi-perspectivity, Kölbel, Lasersohn.

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Fictional characters and Goodman’s inadvertent creation challenge

Artifactualism about fictional characters has it that fictional characters like Andrei Bolkonsky in *War and Peace* as abstract artifacts created by the activities of authors. This talk is part of a larger project of defending and motivating artifactualism about fictional characters. To that end, I will be deflecting a recent challenge by Jeffrey Goodman (2014)—which I will call the inadvertent creation challenge—that is originally posed for those who hold that fictional characters and mythical objects alike are abstract artifacts. The crux of the challenge is this: if we think that astronomers like Le Verrier, in mistakenly hypothesizing the planet Vulcan, inadvertently created an abstract artifact, then the “inadvertent creation” element turns out to be inescapable yet theoretically unattractive. Based on considerations about actually existing concrete objects being featured in fictional works (as Napoleon is in *War and Peace*), I argue that regardless of where one stands on mythical objects, admitting fictional characters as abstract artifacts is enough to give rise to the inadvertent creation challenge; yet this very set of considerations serves to undermine the challenge, indicating that inadvertent creation is not nearly as worrisome after all as Goodman is suggesting. Indeed, the inadvertent creation of some objects that are the referents of proper names is a phenomenon that we *expect* if we accept Saul Kripke’s (1972/1980) influential arguments from ignorance and error, which are based on the observation that competent users of a proper name *N* are often far more ignorant and far more mistaken about the referent of *N* than description theories of proper names allow. Therefore, it’s time for artifactualists about fictional characters (and mythical objects) to stop worrying and learn to love inadvertent creation.

Key words: semantics of fictional discourse, realism about fictional characters, abstract artifacts, mythical objects, Saul Kripke, description theories of proper names

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